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Abstract
We investigate how a domestic subsidy is treated in an international agreement, when a
government, having incentive to use its domestic subsidy as a means of import protection,
can disguise its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention with which to address a
market imperfection. We show that any optimal agreement, as opposed to the conventional
message of the targeting principle, restricts the home government’s freedom to select its
domestic subsidy in order to increase the market-access level for foreign exporters. Our
finding suggests that a proper restriction on domestic subsidy is somewhere between GATT
and WTO rules.
Journal of Literature Classification numbers: F13
Keywords: Treatment of domestic subsidy, International agreement, GATT/WTO rules
1 Introduction
Domestic subsidies have aroused disputes in the international trading system. International
disputes over domestic subsidies are not surprising in that a proper treatment of domestic
subsidies in an international agreement is not obvious. Two contrasting perspectives are
often stated on theoretical and actual trade-policy levels. A domestic subsidy, for instance,
is a “legitimate” instrument with which to address a market imperfection that leads to under-
production. At the same time, however, it may be used as a means of import protection
that oﬀsets the benefits of tariﬀ liberalization. Indeed, this latter perspective has long been
a justification for the continuing attempts by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to
treat domestic subsidies in a strict manner: WTO has introduced additional regulations on
subsidies that were not present in the General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT).
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM agreement) represents
a significant strengthening of disciplines on subsidies.1
A recent study by Bagwell and Staiger (2006) asserts, however, that a proper treatment
of domestic subsidies is the non-violation nullification-or-impairment complaints of GATT
rules. They emphasize that domestic subsidies were treated in a fairly tolerant manner under
GATT rules: subsequent to a tariﬀ commitment, a government was granted the freedom to
alter its domestic subsidies provided that its policy adjustments do not erode the market-
access level implied by the tariﬀ commitment. As Bagwell (2008) highlights, a key diﬀerence
between GATT and WTO rules is that the SCM agreement now restricts the freedom and
allows that a domestic subsidy may be actionable independently of whether it nullifies or
impairs the market-access level associated with a prior tariﬀ commitment. Importantly, in
contrast to the WTO’s actual restrictions on domestic subsidies, the analytical literature on
international agreements broadly supports the conventional theory of government interven-
tion. A central message in the theory of government intervention is the targeting principle
(Bhagwati and Ramaswami, 1963 and Johnson, 1965) under which the optimal intervention
targets the associated market imperfection directly at the margin. From a somewhat dif-
ferent angle, Sykes (2005, 2010) argues that the problem with the WTO’s restrictions on
domestic subsidies arises mainly from the conceptual and practical diﬃculties of determining
which domestic subsidies are used as undesirable protective measure; without such diﬃcul-
1For more discussion, see Sykes (2005, 2010), Bagwell (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2006).
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ties, restrictions on domestic subsidies might be negotiated to target only the protective use
of subsidies.2 Sykes maintains that it is arguably impossible to develop general principles
that distinguish permissible subsidies from impermissible subsidies.
In this paper, motivated by these thorny and yet important issues featured on theoret-
ical and actual trade-policy levels, we investigate how a domestic subsidy is treated in an
international agreement. In particular, our main question is whether the targeting principle
provides a theoretical guideline on the treatment of domestic subsidy as it does in the ex-
isting literature. Two key ingredients are contained in our model. First, a domestic subsidy
is a legitimate instrument with which to address a market imperfection that leads to under-
production in the import-competing sector: the first-best government intervention is to use a
domestic subsidy and internalize the aﬀected margin directly, as prescribed by the targeting
principle. Second, the government, having incentive to use its subsidy as a means of import
protection, can disguise its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention: its trading
partner or a third party cannot determine whether its subsidy is used as protective measure
to circumvent the tariﬀ commitment. We consider a 2-country 2-good model in which trade
occurs in two countries, home and foreign countries, where markets are perfectly compet-
itive. To formalize the two ingredients, our model is augmented in two respects. First,
a domestic production of import good by the home country generates a positive external
value within the border. Second, the home government has private information about its
externality type and thus about the legitimate level of subsidy with which to internalize the
aﬀected margin. We develop an incomplete-information model with a continuum of possible
externality types on an interval. To deliver our main points simply, the model focuses on
the home government’s intervention only in its import-competing sector. Instead, it allows
for two policy instruments: a domestic production subsidy and an import tariﬀ.3
The starting point of our analysis is to identify a central incentive problem: subsequent
to a tariﬀ-reduction commitment, the home government has incentive to raise its domestic
subsidy for the protective purpose.4 When the home government neglects foreign exporters
2The non-violation complaints of GATT rules had also proved diﬃcult to carry out in practice. From 1947 through
1995 only 14 out of the more than 250 Article XXIII proceedings had centered on such complaints (Petersmann, 1997).
This fact appears to reflect the diﬃculties of determining the trade eﬀects of domestic policy changes.
3We also argue that our findings presented below can be extended to a richer policy environment in which a domestic
consumption tax is additionally available.
4The home country’s incentive to substitute one protective instrument for another is typically found in the theory of
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and raises its subsidy, it can lower the world price of the foreign export good and thus
bring a terms-of-trade gain (loss) to the home (foreign) country.5 This problem causes the
concern that the use of subsidy may oﬀset the benefits of the negotiated tariﬀ commitment.
Our model makes this concern clearly evident, by assuming that the home government with
private information can disguise its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention and
circumvent the tariﬀ commitment.6
In this paper, when governments reach an international agreement, they specify the policy
set from which they can subsequently select their policy pairs. We assume that an agreement
is enforceable if and only if the associated policy set is incentive compatible: if the policy set
is (not) incentive compatible, the agreement is (not) enforceable. A policy set is incentive
compatible if it is specified such that the home government with one externality type must
not gain from selecting the policy mix that is prescribed for this government when it has
a diﬀerent externality type. This incentive constraint is analogous to the standard truth-
telling constraint encountered in mechanism-design problems. We say that an agreement
is optimal if the policy set is incentive compatible and generates at least as high expected
global welfare as any incentive-compatible policy set. We consider the stage game: (i) two
governments write an agreement that specifies the policy set and (ii) the home government
observes its externality type and selects its policy mix from the policy set.
We begin with a hypothetical agreement in which the home government is granted the
flexibility (freedom) to select any policy mix as long as its policy choice preserves the world
price at a constant level. Since the home government can lower the world price by raising
subsidy or tariﬀ, the policy set specified by the agreement is an iso-world-price function on
international agreements on two policy instruments.
5The terms-of-trade approach to international agreements is robust in various theoretical settings. Recent empirical
evidence is also consistent with the terms-of-trade theory of agreements (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 2011 and Broda,
Limao and Weinstein, 2008). On actual policy levels, by contrast, terms of trade are not featured as much as
the market-access level implied by trade policy. As Bagwell (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002) show,
however, the market-access loss that foreign exporters experience when the home government raises its tariﬀ (or
subsidy) is simply the “quantity eﬀect” that accompanies the “price eﬀect” of a deterioration in the foreign country’s
terms-of-trade.
6A related concern is raised by the European Communities (WTO, 2002, pp. 2-3): “Significant amounts of
financial support are increasingly granted by governments for ostensibly general activities which in fact directly
benefit the production of certain products. These disguised subsidies can have equally severe trade-distorting eﬀects
and they are potentially much more harmful than more direct subsidies since they confer benefits in a largely
non-transparent manner.”
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which tariﬀ falls as subsidy rises. Then the home government, having no incentive to manip-
ulate the foreign country’s terms of trade, selects the Pigouvian subsidy that internalizes the
production externality at the margin. The policy set acts as a sorting (separating) scheme
along which the home government truthfully reveals its externality type.
Our first finding is that this separating agreement is not optimal: it can be improved on
by an alternative agreement that entails pooling at the top (i.e., the interval of external-
ity types adjoining the highest type). The separating agreement has strength and weakness.
The freedom aﬀorded by the agreement ensures that the home government uses the targeting
principle in its subsidy choice. The use of the targeting principle, however, accompanies high
import tariﬀs especially for low-externality types. Governments may thus look for some way
to keep the subsidy-eﬃciency advantage while reducing tariﬀs by developing another policy
set that has a flatter slope than before. This new set then induces lower-externality types
to raise their subsidies and mimic higher-externality types. Hence, the (global) welfare gain
associated with the first-best intervention can be enjoyed only if the welfare loss associated
with the “informational cost” in the form of high import tariﬀs is also experienced. This
finding shows that no optimal agreement adheres to the targeting principle in its treatment
of domestic subsidy. Intuitively, if an agreement uses a first-best instrument to remedy the
market failure that leads to under-production, then it entails the use of high import tariﬀs,
which additionally stimulates domestic production and thus results in excessive import pro-
tection. The alternative agreement, sacrificing the targeting principle at the top, can lower
import tariﬀs and raise the world price and import volume.
We next explore a pooling agreement in which the targeting principle is neglected such that
policy choices are fully rigid (state-independent). Within the class of pooling agreements, the
optimal agreement restricts its subsidy choice to the expected external value and achieves zero
tariﬀ. We show that this agreement is not optimal: it can be improved on by an alternative
agreement that entails sorting at the bottom (i.e., the interval of externality types adjoining
the lowest type). This alternative agreement grants the home government the freedom to
select any policy mix as long as its policy choice preserves the original world price. It then
extends the original policy set along an iso-world-price function, which improves the home
welfare without imposing a negative terms-of-trade externality on the foreign welfare. We
augment this finding and investigate the possibility that governments tailor the degree of
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restriction on subsidy choice while reaching a zero-tariﬀ agreement. This may occur when
governments agree to adjust the degree of restrictions on subsidy choice, in order to maximize
the benefits of their tariﬀ liberalization. Our second finding is that, regardless of the degree
of restriction on subsidy choice, a zero-tariﬀ agreement is not optimal.
In summary, when contemplating an agreement, governments face a tension between the
objective of promoting domestic eﬃciency and the objective of reducing import tariﬀs. In the
suboptimal agreements stated above, one objective is overly emphasized at the expense of
the other objective. The separating agreement adjusts import tariﬀs to utilize the targeting
principle in its treatment of subsidy; its policy set can be improved by including pooling
at the top. The zero-tariﬀ agreement tailors the degree of restrictions on subsidy choice to
maximize the benefits of zero-tariﬀ commitment; its policy set can be improved by including
sorting at the bottom.
These findings raise the question of how the tension between the two objectives is resolved
in an optimal agreement. Our analysis begins with the monotonicity results: (i) subsidy is
weakly increasing in externality type and (ii) in any optimal agreement, the world price is
weakly decreasing in externality type. The result (i) is given by the single-crossing property:
the home government with higher externality level is more willing to raise subsidy to increase
its domestic production. For the result (ii), we claim that the policy mix for the lowest type
involves the highest world price in an optimal agreement. If the world price is higher for
another type, then the original policy set can be modified to include an iso-world-price
“segment” as a policy subset for all types below that type. This new sorting segment at
the bottom acts to improve the home welfare without imposing a negative terms-of-trade
externality on the foreign welfare, which contradicts the optimality of the original agreement.
With the monotonicity results in place, we present our third finding: any optimal agreement
entails sorting at the bottom and thus “almost surely” permits the use of a positive subsidy.7
If an optimal agreement entails pooling at the bottom, then it involves the highest world price
at the bottom because of the monotonicity. A contradiction is then caused by an alternative
7Probability of using zero subsidy is zero under the sorting at the bottom and the continuous distribution of
externality types. We can equivalently say that a positive subsidy is used in any optimal agreement with probability 1,
or almost surely. In fact, the sorting at the bottom here is diﬀerent from the sorting at the bottom stated above where
the world price is constant. As we show below, on the sorting segment seen in an optimal agreement, the world price is
strictly increasing in externality type.
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agreement that entails sorting at the bottom and preserves the original highest world price;
this new agreement extends the original policy set and improves the home welfare without
imposing a negative terms-of-trade externality on the foreign welfare. We subsequently state
our fourth finding: any optimal agreement entails pooling at the top and thus sacrifices the
targeting principle at the top.
We further establish the property that holds now for the entire externality range: an
optimal agreement cannot include an iso-world-price segment as its policy subset. If such a
sorting segment exists, then a new policy set can be developed by shifting the original sorting
segment towards lower tariﬀs. Instead, this policy set newly includes a pooling point on the
original segment. Intuitively, if the original segment shifts down slightly, then the marginal
global-welfare gain associated with the tariﬀ reduction is strictly positive, but the marginal
global-welfare loss associated with the new pooling approaches zero, since this welfare loss is
measured on the original segment where the foreign welfare is held constant.8 This property
delivers our fifth finding: (i) in its use of domestic subsidy, any optimal agreement violates
the targeting principle “almost everywhere” on the entire interval of externality types and
(ii) in any optimal agreement, an increase (a decrease) in domestic subsidy deteriorates
(improves) the foreign country’s terms of trade.9 A proper treatment of subsidy implied by
our finding is therefore markedly diﬀerent from what is prescribed by the targeting principle:
the home government is not granted the freedom to select any policy mix along an iso-world-
price segment in any optimal agreement. The tension between the two objectives is resolved
when an optimal agreement restricts the home government’s subsidy choice and thus its use
of first-best intervention, in order to respect the foreign country’s terms of trade and increase
the market-access level for foreign exporters.10
8The original policy choices, made along the original iso-world-price segment, maximize the home welfare; the
first-order diﬀerentiation of the home welfare at the original policy choices is zero. If the original segment shifts
down slightly, then the new pooling point approaches the original policy choices along the same segment; the first-order
diﬀerentiation of the home welfare at the new pooling point approaches zero. The marginal home-welfare loss
associated with the new pooling then becomes close to zero.
9The result (i) means that the first-best intervention is permitted not on subintervals of the entire externality-type
interval but only on points (i.e., on a set of measure zero). In a probabilistic context, we can say that the result (i) holds
with probability 1, or almost surely. The result (ii) is given by the monotonicity, together with the property stated
above.
10As Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2002) illuminates, whether an increase in tariﬀ or subsidy by the home government is
said to cause a terms-of-trade loss for the foreign country or a loss of maket-access level for foreign exporters is a matter
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Despite the mounting interest and evident importance, a treatment of domestic subsidies
in an international agreement has not received much attention from the analytical literature.
Bagwell and Staiger (2001, 2006) oﬀer formal analyses of this issue and show that themarket-
access focus of GATT rules is a proper treatment of domestic subsidies: if market access is
secured by the non-violation complaint at the negotiated (eﬃcient) level, then negotiations
with tariﬀs alone can achieve a policy mix that is eﬃcient from a global perspective. Their
finding implies that governments need to be granted the freedom to select any policy mix
provided that their policy adjustments preserve market access at the negotiated level. In
particular, the non-violation complaint plays an important role in achieving an eﬃcient
policy mix in Bagwell and Staiger (2001) if governments, subsequent to their negotiation,
are allowed to adjust tariﬀs to preserve market access at the negotiated level, and in Bagwell
and Staiger (2006) if governments, with tariﬀs bound by their negotiation, have suﬃcient
policy redundancy to keep market access at the negotiated level.11
Our model contains the features commonly observed in Bagwell and Staiger (2001, 2006):
a government, under a market-access commitment, has no incentive to distort subsidy choice
away from the eﬃcient level, and an essential factor that leads to an ineﬃcient policy mix
is an insuﬃcient consideration for the foreign country’s terms of trade. In their complete-
information model, the foreign country’s terms of trade can be duly respected while the
home government addresses the market imperfection with a first-best intervention. In our
model, by contrast, the foreign country’s terms of trade can be suﬃciently respected only
if an agreement restricts the home government’s subsidy choice and its use of first-best
intervention. Consequently, the market-access focus of GATT rules is not a proper restriction
on subsidy choice in our model; since any optimal agreement makes it impossible for the
home government to adjust its domestic subsidy without aﬀecting the market-access level
for foreign exporters, an optimal agreement can be achieved by a policy-mix agreement, not
by a commitment to a market-access level.
Our model bears a methodological similarity to the incomplete-information model by Lee
of semantics. Following their logic, we here define a market-access level that the home government aﬀords to the foreign
country by the import volume implied by policy mixes along an iso-world-price function.
11Suﬃcient policy redundancy is present in their model when governments have an import tariﬀ, a domestic produc-
tion subsidy and a domestic consumption tax.
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(2007).12 In broad terms, however, the two-type model by Lee inherits the findings in Bagwell
and Staiger (2001, 2006), showing that domestic distortions are never commonly realized in
an optimal agreement: an international agreement needs to be in favor of using the targeting
principle in its treatment of domestic policies.13 In our continuous-type model, by contrast,
the use of the targeting principle is almost surely prevented in any optimal agreement due to
the informational costs it accompanies to satisfy incentive compatibility. Indeed, whereas our
basic setting adopts fairly standard features from the existing literature, our finding delivers
a significantly diﬀerent message: an international agreement, as opposed to the conventional
prescription of the targeting principle, needs to restrict the home government’s freedom to
select its domestic subsidy in order to increase the market-access level for foreign exporters.
Our finding thus provides an explanation for the international trading system to depart from
the fairly tolerant treatment of domestic subsidies shown under GATT rules. At the same
time, in common with the existing literature, our finding shows that the use of a positive
subsidy is almost surely permitted in any optimal agreement. It thus oﬀers an incomplete-
information confirmation that the virtual prohibition of domestic production subsidies seen
in the legal environment under WTO is far beyond a proper degree of restriction.
We may also compare the pooling points present at the top and potentially in other places
with the rigid (state-independent) treatment of domestic subsidies shown in Horn, Maggi
and Staiger (2010). Horn, Maggi and Staiger show that trade agreements may exhibit a rigid
use of subsidy when import volume is large. Adopting the approach that the WTO/GATT
regulation is regarded as an incomplete contract, they oﬀer a rationale for the existence of
rigidity. In their model, the use of subsidy is made partially or fully rigid in order to save
contracting costs when import volume is large. In our model, it is made partially rigid in
12Our paper contributes to the theory of trade agreements among governments with private information. Amador
and Bagwell (2011), Bagwell (2009), Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Beshkar (2010), Feenstra and Lewis (1991), Martin
and Vergote (2008) and Park (2011) develop theoretical models of this kind. Importantly, all these models focus
on agreements on tariﬀs. Agreements on two policy instruments are mostly found in complete-information models as in
Bagwell and Staiger (2001, 2006) and Ederington (2001). Lee (2007) is an exception and develops a model in
which privately-informed countries agree on two policy instruments, assuming two externality types and linear demand
and supply functions. Our model allows for continuous externality types and for general demand and supply functions.
13Ederington (2001) also demonstrates a similar result: governments achieve an optimal agreement when they follow
the targeting principle to select their domestic policies, and tailor tariﬀ levels to prevent a country’s deviation
from the agreement. In his extension section, Lee (2007) conjectures that an optimal agreement may allow domestic
distortions when externality types are continuously distributed, without oﬀering a formal analysis.
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order to raise the market-access level for foreign exporters and so increase import volume.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic trade model and states
the incentive problem found in the model. In Section 3, we consider various hypothetical
agreements that are not optimal. In Section 4, we present the features observed in any
optimal agreement and their policy implications. Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix, we
oﬀer additional expositions not contained in the text and provide proofs.
2 The Model
The model contains two key ingredients. First, a domestic subsidy is a legitimate instrument
with which to address a market imperfection that leads to under-production in the import-
competing sector: the first-best government intervention is to use a domestic subsidy and
internalize the aﬀected margin directly, as prescribed by the targeting principle. Second,
a government, having incentive to use its subsidy as a means of import protection, can
disguise its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention: its trading partner or a
third party cannot determine whether its subsidy is used as protective measure to circumvent
the negotiated tariﬀ commitments.
2.1 The Basic Trade Model
We consider a 2-country 2-good model in which trade occurs in two countries, home and
foreign countries, where markets are perfectly competitive. The home country exports one
good to the foreign country in exchange for imports of the other good. We proceed with the
good in the import (export) sector of the home (foreign) country. For the good, the home
country has a downward-sloping demand function D(pd) for the local consumer price pd and
an upward-sloping supply function Q(ps) for the local supplier price ps. For the same good,
the foreign country has the corresponding demand and supply functions,D∗(p∗d) andQ∗(p∗s),
where asterisks denote foreign variables. All functions are positive and twice-continuously
diﬀerentiable.
To formalize the two ingredients stated above, the model is augmented in two respects.
First, a domestic production of the import good by the home country generates a positive
external value within the border. Second, the home government has private information
about its externality type and thus about the legitimate level of subsidy with which to
internalize the aﬀected margin. In particular, we consider an incomplete-information model
9
in which the external value generated by domestic production Q is represented by a non-
negative function v(Q, θ). The function v is increasing and concave in Q and satisfies ∂
2v
∂θ∂Q >
0. The level of θ is private information and is drawn from the support [0, θ] according to
the twice-continuously diﬀerentiable distribution function F (θ). The density, f(θ) ≡ F 0(θ),
is positive everywhere.
To deliver our main points simply, the model focuses on policy intervention by the home
government only in its import-competing sector. Instead, it allows for two policy instruments:
a domestic production subsidy, s, and an import tariﬀ, τ .14 We assume that all policy
instruments are non-prohibitive and expressed in specific terms. In the absence of the foreign
government’s intervention, the foreign consumer and supplier prices are equal, p∗d = ps∗.
This foreign local price may be called the world price pw. The markets in two countries are
integrated, and so a foreign supplier receives the same price for sales in the foreign country
that it receives for sales in the home country after paying the tariﬀ: pw = pd− τ . The wedge
between the home supplier price and the home consumer price is the domestic subsidy:
ps = pd + s. These pricing equations may be rewritten in a useful form:
pd = pw + τ and ps = pw + τ + s. (1)
Equilibrium prices, denoted by bpw, bpd and bps, are determined by the market-clearing condi-
tion:
D(pd) +D∗(pw) = Q(ps) +Q∗(pw). (2)
Plugging the consumer and supplier prices into the market-clearing condition, we may find
the equilibrium world price bpw(s, τ). The equilibrium consumer and supplier prices are then
given by bpd(s, τ) = bpw(s, τ) + τ and bps(s, τ) = bpw(s, τ)+ τ + s. It is also immediate from (2)
that, if the home government raises s or τ , then it can lower the world price of the foreign
export good:
∂bpw
∂s
=
Q0
D0 −Q0 − (Q∗0 −D∗0) < 0 (3)
∂bpw
∂τ
= − D
0 −Q0
D0 −Q0 − (Q∗0 −D∗0) < 0. (4)
14We can readily extend the model by assuming a symmetric structure: the levels of θ are iid across sectors
and the foreign government also intervenes in its import sector. We argue later that our model can also be extended to
a richer policy environment in which a domestic consumption tax is additionally available.
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As seen in the Appendix, an increase in s or τ promotes the home production of the foreign
export good, Q(bps), and reduces the home import, D(bpd) − Q(bps). At the same time, an
increase in s or τ imposes a negative terms-of-trade externality on the foreign welfare. The
policy change that lowers the world price is harmful to foreign exporters and is beneficial
to foreign consumers. The benefit to foreign consumers amounts to a transfer from foreign
producers to foreign consumers. The net foreign welfare decreases when the world price falls.
We now describe government preferences. The welfare function of each country is sep-
arable across import and export sectors; thus, we can again focus on the welfare function
in the home import sector which is the foreign export sector. The home welfare consists of
consumer surplus, profits, net revenue (revenue from the import tariﬀ minus expenditures
on the production subsidy) and the aggregate value of the production externality. The home
welfare for externality type θ is
W (s, τ ; θ) ≡ CS(bpd) +Π(bps) + τ ·M(s, τ)− s ·Q(bps) + v(Q(bps), θ) (5)
where M(s, τ) ≡ D(bpd) − Q(bps). Consumer surplus and profits are given by CS(bpd) ≡R p
epd D(p)dp and Π(bps) ≡ R epsp Q(p)dp, where p = sup{p : D(p) > 0} and p = inf{p : Q(p) > 0}.
A policy mix selected by the home government aﬀects the foreign welfare through the world
price. The foreign welfare is the sum of the foreign consumer surplus and profits:
W ∗(s, τ) ≡ CS∗(bpw) +Π∗(bpw). (6)
The home government must care about a negative terms-of-trade externality on the foreign
welfare, in order to maximize the global welfare:
WG(s, τ ; θ) ≡W (s, τ ; θ) +W ∗(s, τ). (7)
A useful feature satisfied by the iso-welfare function for the home country, {(s, τ) :
W (s, τ ; θ) = κ for a constant κ}, is the single-crossing property: for θ2 > θ1, the iso-welfare
function for θ2 crosses the iso-welfare function for θ1 from above only once if it crosses. As
we show in the Appendix, this property holds, since the home government with higher θ
is more willing to raise subsidy to increase its domestic production under the assumption
∂2v
∂θ∂Q > 0. We make additional assumptions to simplify our analysis.
Assumption 1. (i)W (s, τ ; θ) andW ∗(s, τ) are strictly concave in s and τ . (ii) The function
v takes a linear form: v(Q(ps), θ) = θ ·Q(ps). (iii) M(s = θ, τ = 0) > 0.
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The assumption (i) is satisfied for a large family of demand and supply functions, including
linear functions. This assumption implies that the global welfare WG(s, τ ; θ) is also strictly
concave in s and τ . The linearity assumption (ii) greatly simplifies our exposition: given
∂v
∂Q = θ, the privately-observed parameter θ now directly represents the legitimate level
of subsidy with which to internalize the aﬀected margin. Our findings established below,
however, would qualitatively remain unaﬀected without this assumption. The assumption
(iii) ensures that government intervention is non-prohibitive for the policy mixes we consider
below.
We lastly want to emphasize that our basic model builds on a familiar setting found
in Ederington (2002), Lee (2007) and Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2010). Our objective is to
adopt fairly standard features from the existing literature and deliver a significantly diﬀerent
message. We may readily develop an alternative model to deliver a similar message if we
convey the two essential ingredients of the current model: the single-crossing property and
the strict concavity of welfare functions.
2.2 First-Best and Nash Policies
The home government faces a finite choice set {s | s : [0, θ] → R+} × {τ | τ : [0, θ] → R+}
and selects a policy mix conditional on its externality type. A typical policy mix selected by
externality type θ may be denoted by (s(θ), τ(θ)). The expected home welfare and expected
global welfare may then be represented by EθW (s(θ), τ(θ); θ) =
R θ
0
W (s(θ), τ(θ); θ)dF (θ)
and EθWG(s(θ), τ(θ); θ) =
R θ
0
WG(s(θ), τ(θ); θ)dF (θ), respectively.
The first-best policy mix, (sE(θ), τE(θ)), maximizes the global welfare WG(s, τ ; θ).15 The
home government then follows the targeting principle for its subsidy choice and achieves zero
tariﬀ:
sE(θ) = θ and τE(θ) = 0 for all θ. (8)
The Nash (non-cooperative) policy mix, (sN(θ), τN(θ)), maximizes the home welfareW (s, τ ; θ).
The home government then follows the targeting principle for its subsidy choice and selects
its import tariﬀ to capture the terms-of-trade gain:
sN(θ) = θ and τN(θ) =
E∗(bpw)
E∗0(bpw) for all θ, (9)
where bpw = bpw(s = sN(θ), τ = τN(θ)) and E∗(bpw) = Q∗(bpw)−D∗(bpw). In fact, the findings
15In the Appendix, we derive the first-best and Nash policies.
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in (8) and (9) require that the highest externality type θ should be below a certain level for
government intervention to be non-prohibitive.
2.3 Objective of Agreement
In this paper, we consider the stage game: (i) two governments write an agreement that
specifies the policy set and (ii) the home government observes its externality type and selects
its policy mix from the policy set. This stage game indicates that, when arranging an
agreement, governments specify the policy set from which they can subsequently select their
policy pairs.
We assume that an agreement is enforceable if and only if the associated policy set is
incentive compatible: if the policy set is (not) incentive compatible, the agreement is (not)
enforceable. A policy set is incentive compatible if it is specified such that the home govern-
ment with one externality type must not gain from selecting the policy mix that is prescribed
for this government when it has a diﬀerent externality type. This incentive constraint is anal-
ogous to the standard truth-telling constraint encountered in mechanism-design problems.
We also say that an agreement is optimal if the policy set is incentive compatible and gener-
ates at least as high expected global welfare as any incentive-compatible policy set. Formally,
let (s(θ), τ(θ)) represent the policy mix selected by type θ under a policy set {(s, τ )}, and let
(es(θ),eτ(θ)) denote the policy mix selected by type θ under an alternative policy set {(es, eτ )}.
An agreement is optimal if its policy set {(s, τ )} is incentive compatible,
W (s(θ), τ(θ); θ) ≥W (s(bθ), τ(bθ); θ) for all θ and bθ 6= θ, (IC(θ))
and satisfies
EθWG(s(θ), τ(θ); θ) ≥ EθWG(es(θ),eτ(θ); θ)
for any incentive-compatible policy set {(es, eτ )}.16 Equivalently, an agreement is not optimal
if there exists an alternative policy set that is incentive compatible and generates higher
expected global welfare than does the original policy set.
2.4 Incentive Problem
The starting point of our analysis is to identify a central incentive problem. We emphasize
that the incentive problem presented here is standard and commonly observed on theoretical
16Incentive compatibility of {(hs, hτ )} can be written as W (hs(θ),hτ(θ); θ) ≥W (hs(eθ),hτ(eθ); θ) for all θ and eθ 6= θ.
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and actual policy levels. We begin with a hypothetical agreement in which the policy set is
given by:17
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}. (10)
The home government with externality type θ then maximizesW (s, τ ; θ) subject to (10). For
any policy mix (s, τ) in (10), the world price is constant and so the foreign welfare W ∗(s, τ)
is constant. Since an increase in s or τ lowers the world price, the policy set (10) can be
uniquely represented by an iso-world-price function, τ = τ sep(s):
τ sep(s) =
Q0
D0 −Q0 [s− θ]. (11)
This function is strictly decreasing and crosses the policy point (s, τ) = (θ, 0). The slope,
dτsep
ds =
Q0
D0−Q0 < 0, is given by (3) and (4). Along this function, having no incentive to use its
subsidy and manipulate terms of trade, the home government uses the first-best instrument
and internalizes the production externality at the margin. We formalize this finding.
Lemma 1. In the policy set (10), the home government’s subsidy choice satisfies s(θ) = θ
for all θ.
The proof is in the Appendix. Given the set (10), the home government with type θ
follows the targeting principle for its subsidy choice, s(θ) = θ, and select its tariﬀ level,
τ sep(θ), to keep the world price at bpw(s = θ, τ = 0). The iso-world-price function (10) thus
acts as a sorting (separating) scheme that elicits a truthful revelation of all externality types.
Lemma 1 typically holds in terms-of-trade models and also leads to additional points.
Consider first an alternative policy set in which tariﬀs are now fixed and close or equal to
zero for all θ. This alternative policy set displays the central incentive problem: subsequent
to the tariﬀ-reduction commitment, the home government has incentive to raise its subsidy
for the protective purpose. In other words, if the home government neglects foreign exporters
and increases its subsidy, then it can lower the world price of the foreign export good and
thus bring a terms-of-trade gain (loss) to the home (foreign) country. Consider next another
17Assumption 1 (iii), M(s = θ, τ = 0) > 0, indicates that government intervention is non-prohibitive for any
(s, τ) along the iso-world price function (10) where the trade volume, represented by E∗(epw), is constant. Further,
since E∗(epw) increases in epw, government intervention is non-prohibitive for any (s, τ) in the region {(s, τ) : epw(s, τ) ≥
epw(s = θ, τ = 0)} under the assumption.
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policy set that preserves the same world price in (10):
{(s1, τ 1), (s2, τ 2)} where bpw(s1, τ 1) = bpw(s2, τ 2) = bpw(s = θ, τ = 0). (12)
This policy set oﬀers only two policy points on the iso-world-price function (10) and so
entails pooling. The home welfare is higher in (10) than in (12) except for θ ∈ {s1, s2}. We
generalize this point.
Lemma 2. For all θ, the home welfare is at least as high in (10) as in any policy set where
the world price is constant at bpw(s = θ, τ = 0).
Lemma 1 and 2 hold at a general level where the policy set (10) is modified to
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θ, τ = κ) for a constant κ ≥ 0}. (13)
Suppose that κ increases from zero and so the iso-world-price function shifts up from (10).
Subsidy choice then remains the same, s(θ) = θ, whereas import tariﬀs rise along the new
sorting scheme. Thus, for each θ, the world price falls and at the same time, the foreign
welfare and the global welfare fall.18 The eﬀect on the home welfare is less clear; it depends
on the initial level of κ and parameters. We now assume that, if κ increases slightly from
zero, then the home welfare increases for all θ.
Assumption 2. For all θ, an increase in κ from zero in the policy set (13) raises the home
welfare.
This assumption is satisfied if and only if tariﬀs are lower in the set (10) than in the Nash
policies: τ sep(θ) < τN(θ) for all θ. This inequality holds for a large family of demand and
supply functions, if θ is below a certain level and the term E
∗(epw)
E∗0(epw) in (9) is suﬃciently large.
Indeed, E
∗(epw)
E∗0(epw) is large when the home country is large and has a significant incentive to
manipulate terms of trade. Assumption 2 ensures that the central incentive problem stated
above occurs in the region {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) ≥ bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}: for any policy mix in the
region (below the Nash policies), there exists some θ for which the home government has
incentive to raise its subsidy and capture the terms-of-trade gain.
18This part of proof is detailed in the proof of Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
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3 Suboptimal Agreement
In this section, we explore two diﬀerent hypothetical agreements: an agreement in which
subsidy choice is determined by the targeting principle, and an agreement in which subsidy
choice is regulated to achieve zero tariﬀ. We show that these agreements are not optimal.
All findings established in this and next sections are quite general, in that they hold for any
distribution function F without imposing any additional assumption or technical restriction.
3.1 Separating Agreement
We begin with a (full) separating agreement in which subsidy choice is determined by the
targeting principle, s(θ) = θ for all θ. The policy set specified by the agreement must satisfy
the incentive compatibility: θ = argmaxsW (s, τ ; θ) for all (s, τ) in the policy set. Looking
for such incentive-compatible policy sets, we can establish two findings to maximize the
expected global welfare. First, among the policy sets in which the world price is constant
at the same world price bpw(s = θ, τ = κ) where κ ≥ 0, the policy set that entails full
sorting is preferred to any policy set that entails a partial or full pooling. This result is
immediate from Lemma 1 and 2. Second, among the policy sets that entail full sorting
along diﬀerent iso-world-price functions, the policy set in which the world price is higher is
preferred to the policy set in which the world price is lower. This result directly follows from
the policy set (13): if the iso-world-price function shifts up as κ rises, then the global welfare
WG(s(θ), τ(θ); θ) decreases for all θ. We rephrase these two findings.
Lemma 3. The expected global welfare is at least as high in the policy set (10) as in any
policy set in the region {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) ≤ bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}.
The agreement with the policy set (10) has strength and weakness.19 In the agreement,
the home government is granted the freedom to select any policy mix as long as its pol-
icy choices preserve the world price at bpw(s = θ, τ = 0). This freedom ensures that the
home government uses the targeting principle in its subsidy choice. The use of the target-
ing principle, however, accompanies high import tariﬀs especially for low externality types.
Governments may thus look for some way to keep the subsidy-eﬃciency advantage while
reducing tariﬀs by developing another policy set that is strictly decreasing and is flatter
19Given that τsep(θ) < τN (θ) for all θ under Assumption 2, the policy set (10) strictly improves on the (non-
cooperative) Nash policies.
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than the function τ = τ sep(s). This new policy set then induces lower-externality types to
mimic higher-externality types and raise their subsidies beyond the legitimate levels. Hence,
the global welfare gain associated with the first-best intervention can be enjoyed only if the
global welfare loss associated with the informational cost in the form of high import tariﬀs
is also experienced.20 Indeed, among the agreements in which subsidy choice is determined
by the targeting principle for all θ, the agreement with the policy set (10) is optimal.
We next show that this agreement can be improved on by an alternative agreement that
entails pooling at the top (i.e., the subinterval of [0, θ] adjoining the highest type θ) with the
policy set:
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θc, τ = 0) for θc ∈ (0, θ)}. (14)
The home government can now select any policy mix as long as its policy choice preserves
the world price at bpw(s = θc, τ = 0) > bpw(s = θ, τ = 0). The alternative set (14) entails
sorting with lower tariﬀs than before, s(θ) = θ and τ(θ) < τ sep(θ) for θ < θc, and it entails
pooling at the policy mix (θc, 0) at the top for θ ∈ [θc, θ]. Observing that the alternative
agreement approaches the original agreement as θc → θ, we can diﬀerentiate the expected
global welfare with respect to θc and show that the expected global welfare is higher in the
alternative agreement. Intuitively, if θc falls slightly from θ, then the alternative agreement
decreases tariﬀs along the new sorting scheme while keeping the pooling point (θc, 0) close
to the first-best policy mix (θ, 0) at the top.
Proposition 1. An agreement that adheres to the targeting principle in its use of domestic
subsidy, s(θ) = θ for all θ, is not optimal.
The proof is in the Appendix. If an agreement uses the first-best instrument to remedy
the market failure that leads to under-production, then it entails the use of high import
tariﬀs, which additionally stimulates domestic production and thus results in excessive im-
port protection. Proposition 1 shows that in its choice of domestic subsidy, any optimal
agreement sacrifices the targeting principle at least for some θ; by sacrificing the first-best
intervention for some θ, it can reduce import tariﬀs and raise the world price and import
volume.
20Consider any alternative policy set that is represented by a decreasing function τ = τalt(s) and is flatter than τ =
τsep(s) for all s. We can show that the alternative policy set is not optimal. The limiting case is that tariﬀs
are bound to zero for all θ. As we show below, this agreement in the limiting case is also not optimal.
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3.2 Tariﬀ Liberalization and Restriction on Subsidy Choice
In this subsection, we consider the possibility that an agreement may save the informational
cost in the form of import tariﬀs by imposing restrictions on subsidy choice. We first explore
a pooling agreement in which the targeting principle is neglected such that policy choices are
fully rigid (state-independent). The policy set can then be represented by a point, (sp, τ p),
where sp and τ p are constant. Incentive compatibility is trivial and apparently satisfied.
Since all equilibrium prices are constant for θ in this agreement, the expected global welfare
becomes
EθWG(sp, τ p; θ) =WG(sp, τ p;E[θ]). (15)
The optimal pooling agreement is thus characterized by sp = E[θ] and τ p = 0. We show that
this agreement can be improved on by an alternative agreement that entails sorting at the
bottom (i.e., the subinterval of [0, θ] adjoining the lowest type 0) with the policy set:
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = E[θ], τ = 0)}. (16)
The alternative agreement grants the home government the freedom to select any policy
mix as long as its policy choice preserves the original world price bpw(s = E[θ], τ = 0); it
extends the policy set along the iso-world-price segment (16) and entails sorting for θ ≤ E[θ]
and pooling at the point (E[θ], 0) for θ > E[θ]. The home-welfare improvement, made
for θ < E[θ], does not impose a negative terms-of-trade eﬀect on the foreign producers.
Hence, the expected global welfare is higher in the alternative agreement than in the original
agreement.
We augment this finding and consider the possibility that governments tailor the degree
of restriction on subsidy choice while reaching a zero-tariﬀ agreement. This may occur when
governments agree to adjust the degree of restrictions on subsidy choice, in order to maximize
the benefits of their tariﬀ liberalization. Since an optimal policy set cannot be a singleton
as shown above, we begin with the policy set {(s1, 0), (s2, 0)} where s1 and s2 are constant
and s2 > s1. We restrict attention to s1 < θ; if s1 ≥ θ, the policy set would be in the region
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) ≤ bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)} where the agreement cannot be optimal by Lemma 3
and Proposition 1. We also assume that each policy mix is selected by at least some θ; the
policy set would otherwise be equivalent to a singleton. We can show that the agreement
with {(s1, 0), (s2, 0)} is not optimal, whether s1 > 0 or s1 = 0. For the first case (s1 > 0),
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we develop an alternative policy set that has two subsets:
{{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = s1, τ = 0)}, (s2, 0)}. (17)
The home government can then select any policy mix along an iso-world-price segment, or it
can select (s2, 0). The policy-set extension is made along the segment while preserving the
higher world price in the original set, bpw(s = s1, τ = 0)} > bpw(s = s2, τ = 0); the associated
home-welfare improvement, made for some θ < s1, does not impose a negative terms-of-trade
eﬀect on the foreign producers, which indicates that the original agreement is not optimal.
For the second case (s1 = 0), as we show in the Appendix, we may develop an alternative
policy set under two possibilities: (i) (0, 0) is selected only by the lowest type 0 and (ii) (0, 0)
is selected by types θ ∈ [0,bθ] for some bθ > 0.
Governments may further reduce the degree of restrictions on subsidy choice by oﬀering
more subsidy options. We can show, however, that a zero-tariﬀ agreement with the policy
set {(s1, 0), (s2, 0), ..., (sK , 0)} is not optimal, by applying the previous argument to the first
two choices, (s1, 0) and (s2, 0). A zero-tariﬀ agreement in the limiting case is that subsidy
choice is left to the home government’s discretion. Subsidy choice would then be above a
certain level, s > 0. We restrict attention to s < θ; if s ≥ θ, all policy choices would be made
in the region {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) ≤ bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)} where the agreement cannot be optimal.
We develop an alternative policy set that has two subsets:
{{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = s, τ = 0)}, {(s, 0) : s ∈ [s, θ]}}. (18)
The home government can then select any policy mix along an iso-world-price segment, or
it can select any subsidy s ∈ [s, θ] under zero tariﬀ. The policy-set extension is made along
the segment while preserving the highest world price in the original set, bpw(s = s, τ = 0);
the home-welfare improvement, made for some θ < s, does not impose a negative terms-of-
trade eﬀect on the foreign welfare, which indicates that the zero-tariﬀ agreement in which
subsidy choice is discretionary is not optimal.21 The following proposition summarizes our
discussion.
Proposition 2. Regardless of the degree of restriction on subsidy choice, a zero-tariﬀ
agreement in which τ(θ) = 0 for all θ is not optimal.
21We may extend our argument and show that a zero-tariﬀ agreement is not optimal when its policy set includes some
line segments under zero tariﬀ such as {(s, 0) : s ∈ {[s1, s1], ..., [sK , sK ]}}.
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In summary, when contemplating an agreement, governments face a tension between the
objective of promoting domestic eﬃciency and the objective of reducing import tariﬀs. In
the suboptimal agreements stated above, one objective is overly emphasized at the expense
of the other objective. The agreement in Proposition 1 adjusts import tariﬀs to utilize the
targeting principle in its treatment of subsidy; the policy set can be improved by including
pooling at the top. The agreement in Proposition 2 tailors the degree of restrictions on
subsidy choice to maximize the benefits of zero-tariﬀ commitment; the policy set can be
improved by including sorting at the bottom.
4 Optimal Agreement
In this section, we show how the tension between the objective of promoting domestic eﬃ-
ciency and the objective of reducing import tariﬀs is resolved in an optimal agreement. We
first confirm that any optimal agreement entails sorting at the bottom and pooling at the top.
We next show that any optimal agreement restricts the home government’s subsidy choice
and thus its use of first-best intervention. In this way, an optimal agreement respects terms
of trade for the foreign country and increases the market-access level for foreign exporters.
4.1 Sorting at the Bottom
In this subsection, we confirm that any optimal agreement entails sorting at the bottom. We
proceed to present the monotonicity results: (i) s(θ) is weakly increasing in θ and (ii) in any
optimal agreement, the world price is weakly decreasing in θ. The result (i) is given by the
single-crossing property. Suppose that an agreement allows s(θ2) < s(θ1) for some θ2 > θ1.
Incentive compatibility of θ1 implies that (s(θ2), τ(θ2)) must be located in the region:
{(s, τ) :W (s, τ ; θ1) ≤W (s(θ1), τ(θ1); θ1) and s < s(θ1)}. (19)
Select the iso-welfare function for θ2 that crosses the point (s(θ1), τ(θ1)). This iso-welfare
function crosses the iso-welfare function for θ1 from above only once. Any policy mix in (19)
is then less preferred to (s(θ1), τ(θ1)) for θ2, which violates incentive compatibility.
The result (ii) is given by optimality. Suppose that an agreement allows bpw(s(θ1), τ(θ1)) <bpw(s(θ2), τ(θ2)) for some θ2 > θ1. These two types are selected such that type θ1 (type θ2)
involves the highest world price for all θ ≤ θ1 (for all θ > θ1).22 Pick the point (s2, τ 2)
22The proof is provided in greater detail in the Appendix.
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that maximizes the world price on the iso-welfare function for θ2, {(s, τ) : W (s, τ ; θ2) =
W (s(θ2), τ(θ2); θ2)}. The original policy set can then be modified by including an iso-world-
price segment up to the point (s2, τ 2), {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s2, τ 2) for s ≤ s2}. Then
types θ ≤ θ2 do not mimic types θ > θ2 but selects their policy mixes along the new sorting
segment at the bottom. The incentive of types θ > θ2 to mimic types θ ≤ θ2 can be ignored,
since the potential home-welfare gain by types θ > θ2 from mimicking types θ ≤ θ2 does not
deteriorate the foreign country’s terms of trade for any θ. The new sorting segment thus
acts to increase the expected global welfare, which indicates that the original agreement is
not optimal. We summarize the monotonicity results.
Lemma 4. (i) Subsidy choice is weakly increasing in θ. (ii) In any optimal agreement, the
world price is weakly decreasing in θ.
We next specify the policy mix for the lowest type, (s(0), τ(0)), in two steps. First, in
any optimal agreement, (s(0), τ(0)) is in the region:
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) > bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}. (20)
If an optimal agreement allows bpw(s(0), τ(0)) ≤ bpw(s = θ, τ = 0), then bpw(s(θ), τ(θ)) ≤bpw(s = θ, τ = 0) for all θ ∈ [0, θ] by Lemma 4 (ii). Lemma 3 and Proposition 1, in turn,
contradict the optimality of the agreement. Second, in any optimal agreement, s(0) = 0 and
τ(0) > 0. Assume that an optimal agreement allows s(0) > 0. The policy set can then be
modified by including an iso-world-price segment up to the point (s(0), τ(0)):
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s(0), τ(0)) for s ≤ s(0)}. (21)
The policy subset for s > s(0) remains the same. The policy-set extension is made along
the segment while preserving the highest world price in the original set: bpw(s(0), τ(0)) ≥bpw(s(θ), τ(θ)) for all θ > 0 by Lemma 4 (ii). The home-welfare improvement, made for some
θ ≤ s(0), does not impose a negative terms-of-trade eﬀect on the foreign welfare for any θ,
which contradicts the optimality assumption. Now, given s(0) = 0, if an agreement allows
τ(0) = 0, we may explore two possibilities: (i) (0, 0) is selected only by the lowest type 0 and
(ii) (0, 0) is selected by types θ ∈ [0,bθ]. A similar procedure used in the proof of Proposition
2 confirms that the agreement with (s(0), τ(0)) = (0, 0) is not optimal. We summarize the
results.
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Lemma 5. In any optimal agreement, the policy mix for type 0, (s(0), τ(0)), is in the region
(20) and satisfies s(0) = 0 and τ(0) > 0.
We finally show that any optimal agreement entails a sorting segment as a policy subset at
the bottom for θ ∈ [0, θc] where θc > 0.23 Assume that an optimal agreement entails pooling
at (s(0), τ(0)) for θ ∈ [0, θ0] for some θ0 > 0. Then (s(0), τ(0)) satisfies the property in
Lemma 5. Pick the point (s0, τ 0) that maximizes the world price on the iso-welfare function
for θ0, {(s, τ) :W (s, τ ; θ0) =W (s(0), τ(0); θ0)}. The original policy set can then be modified
by including an iso-world-price segment up to the point (s0, τ 0), {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s0, τ 0)
for s ≤ s0}. Then types θ ≤ θ0 do not mimic types θ > θ0 but selects their policy mixes
along the new segment. The incentive of types θ > θ0 to mimic types θ ≤ θ0 can be ignored,
since the potential home-welfare gain by types θ > θ0 from mimicking types θ ≤ θ0 does not
deteriorate the foreign country’s terms of trade for any θ. The new sorting segment thus
acts to increase the expected global welfare, which contradicts the optimality assumption.
Proposition 3.Any optimal agreement entails sorting at the bottom: there exists θc ∈ (0, θ)
such that the policy set includes a sorting segment for θ ∈ [0, θc].
An important implication, immediate from the sorting at the bottom, is that the use of a
positive subsidy is “almost surely” permitted in any optimal agreement: probability of using
zero subsidy is zero under the continuous distribution F . Thus, in consistent with the existing
literature, our finding shows that the virtual prohibition of domestic production subsidies
seen in the legal environment under WTO is far beyond a proper degree of restrictions. It
is, however, premature to conclude that, in an optimal agreement, the home government is
granted the freedom to select any policy mix along an iso-world-price segment at the bottom.
As we characterize below, the sorting at the bottom here is diﬀerent from the sorting segment
in which the world price is constant and s(θ) = θ.
23The sorting segment in this result is not necessarily an iso-world-price segment. This result does not hold
if and only if there exists an optimal agreement in which (i) types θ ∈ [0, θ0] for some θ0 > 0 pool at (s(0), τ(0)), or (ii)
only the lowest type 0 selects (s(0), τ(0)), while types θ ∈ (0, θ0] pool at a separate point (es,eτ) or select their policies
from the region {(s, τ) : s ≥ es and epw(s, τ) ≤ epw(es,eτ)} for some es > 0. The case (i) causes a contradiction as we
show below; more detailed proof for this is in the Appendix. The case (ii) is also impossible, since the original policy set
is easily improved by including an iso-world-price segment up to the point (es,eτ), {(s, τ) : epw(s, τ) = epw(es,eτ) for s ≤ es}.
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4.2 Pooling at the Top
In this subsection, we show that any optimal agreement entails pooling at the top. We first
show that, in any optimal agreement, any policy mix with a positive tariﬀ is restricted to
the region (20): for any θ, if τ(θ) > 0, then bpw(s(θ), τ(θ)) > bpw(s = θ, τ = 0). Assume that
an optimal agreement allows τ(eθ) > 0 and bpw(s(eθ), τ(eθ)) ≤ bpw(s = θ, τ = 0) for some eθ > 0.
Lemma 5 implies that there exists a type bθ < eθ such that
bθ = sup{θ : bpw(s(θ), τ(θ)) > bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}. (22)
Suppose that the iso-welfare function for bθ, {(s, τ) : W (s, τ ;bθ) = W (s(bθ), τ(bθ);bθ)}, crosses
the iso-world-price function, {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}, from below at a point
(bs,bτ) where bτ > 0.24 The original policy set can be improved in two steps. First, it can be
modified by including an iso-world-price segment at the top from the point (bs,bτ):
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θ, τ = 0) for s ≥ bs}. (23)
The policy subset for s < bs remains the same. The segment (23) is arranged to make type bθ
indiﬀerent between (s(bθ), τ(bθ)) and (bs,bτ). The new policy set thus entails pooling at (bs,bτ)
for θ ∈ (bθ, bs) and the sorting segment for θ ∈ [bs, θ]. For the aﬀected types θ > bθ, the
global welfare is at least as high in the alternative agreement as in the original agreement.
Intuitively, the policy-set modification induces the pooling for θ ∈ (bθ, bs) to involve a weakly
lower domestic distortion in the form of “over-subsidy” (s(θ) > θ) at a weakly higher world
price, and induces the sorting for θ ∈ [bs, θ] to involve a weakly higher world price. Second,
the original policy set can be further modified by shifting the sorting segment (23) down, so
as to entail a pooling point (θc, 0) at the top for θ ∈ [θc, θ]:
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θc, τ = 0) for s ≥ bs0}. (24)
The policy subset for s < bs0 remains the same. The segment (24) is arranged to make type bθ
indiﬀerent between (s(bθ), τ(bθ)) and (bs0,bτ 0). As in Proposition 1, if θc → θ, then the expected
global welfare is now strictly higher in the new agreement than in the original agreement.
This contradicts the optimality of the original agreement.
Lemma 6. In any optimal agreement, any policy mix with a positive tariﬀ is restricted to
the region (20): {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) > bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}.
24In the Appendix, Proof of Lemma 6 considers all other possibilities.
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We finally present the pooling at the top in two steps. First, any optimal agreement
entails pooling at the top for θ ∈ [θc, θ) where θc < θ.25 Assume that an optimal agreement
entails sorting for θ ∈ [bθ, θ) for some bθ < θ. A sorting scheme at the top cannot exist in (20);
in this region, given the monotonicity of the world price, any policy subset causes pooling at
least for some range of θ at the top. A sorting scheme cannot exist outside (20) either; in this
region, any policy subset with positive tariﬀs violates Lemma 6, and sorting with zero tariﬀ
also violates optimality.26 Second, the pooling at the top seen in any optimal agreement
involves zero tariﬀ. Assume that an optimal agreement entails pooling for θ ∈ [θc, θ) at a
policy mix (sp, τ p) with a positive tariﬀ τ p > 0. Then (sp, τ p) must be in the region (20)
by Lemma 6. The original policy set can then be modified by including an iso-world-price
segment from the point (sp, τp):
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(sp, τ p) for all s ≥ sp}. (25)
The policy subset for s < sp remains the same. Lemma 4 (i) and (ii) imply that the original
policy subset for s < sp is in the region {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) ≥ bpw(sp, τ p) and s < sp}. The
modification thus induces types θ ≥ sp to select their policy mixes along the sorting segment
(25). Since types θ < θc did not select (sp, τ p) under the original policy set, they stay with
their original choices under the alternative set.27 Hence, the policy-set extension in (25)
increases the home welfare for some θ ≥ sp without decreasing the world price for any θ,
which contradicts the optimality of the original agreement. Given the sorting at the bottom
for θ ∈ [0, θc], we now present the pooling at the top.
Proposition 4. Any optimal agreement entails pooling at zero tariﬀ at the top: there exists
θc ∈ [θc, θ) such that the policy set includes a pooling point with zero tariﬀ for θ ∈ [θc, θ).
25This result includes the circumstances under which (i) types θ ∈ [θc, θ] pool at a policy point (sp, τp) and (ii) types
θ ∈ [θc, θ) pool at a point (sp, τp) and only the highest type θ selects another point (s(θ), τ(θ)). In other words, the
result means that any optimal agreement has an interval at the top [θc, θ] on which a pooling point (sp, τp) is selected
with probability 1. The result does not hold if and only if there exists an optimal agreement that entails sorting for
θ ∈ [eθ, θ) for some eθ < θ. The sorting for θ ∈ [eθ, θ) here is not necessarily the sorting along an iso-world-price segment.
26In this region, sorting for θ ∈ [eθ, θ) with zero tariﬀ is possible only if subsidy increases beyond θ. Pick the
policy point (s, 0) that has the lowest level of subsidy in the sorting scheme for θ ∈ [eθ, θ). We can immediately find that,
for these types, this sorting scheme can be improved on by the pooling point (s, 0).
27Note that θc ≤ sp; if θc > sp, then types θ ∈ (sp, θc)must also have selected (sp, τp) in the original policy set, which
violates our assumption.
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In summary, any optimal agreement contains two necessary features: sorting at the bottom
and pooling at the top. Proposition 3 shows that any optimal agreement almost surely
permits the use of a positive subsidy in order to address the market imperfection and promote
domestic eﬃciency, and Proposition 4 shows that any optimal agreement prevents the use of
targeting principle at the top in order to lower import tariﬀs and raise the world price and
import volume.
4.3 Restriction on Subsidy Choice
In this subsection, we present a general feature of optimality that holds now for the entire
range of θ. A diﬃculty with characterizing an optimal policy set is that the world price may
change in θ. Our analysis therefore proceeds from the simplest policy set that entails sorting
at the bottom and pooling at the top. This policy set involves only one world price:
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θc, τ = 0)}. (26)
We restrict attention to θc ∈ (0, θ), since θc > 0 is required by Proposition 2 and θc < θ by
Proposition 1. The home government can then select any policy mix as long as its policy
choice preserves the world price bpw(s = θc, τ = 0). As noted above, the policy set (26) has
strength and weakness: for θ ≤ θc, the targeting principle is used in the subsidy choice,
which however accompanies the use of high import tariﬀs.
We develop an alternative policy set that consists of two separate subsets and includes a
jump between the two. The jump is made from (s(θc), τ(θc)) to (s(θc), τ(θc)) such that type
θc < θc is indiﬀerent between the two choices.28 This jump then causes a new pooling point:
types θ ∈ (θc, θc) now pool at (s(θc), τ(θc)) and bpw(s(θc), τ(θc)) > bpw(s(θc), τ(θc)).29 In
particular, we consider the policy set in which the second subset is a singleton and endpoint
of the original sorting segment (26) so that (s(θc), τ(θc)) = (θc, 0). The alternative agreement
28Incentive compatibility for θc implies that (s(θc), τ(θc)) is in the region {(s, τ) :W (s, τ ; θc) ≤W (s(θc), τ(θc); θc)},
and optimality implies that type θc is indiﬀerent between (s(θc), τ(θc)) and (s(θc), τ(θc)), W (s(θc), τ(θc); θc) =
W (s(θc), τ(θc); θc); if (s(θc), τ(θc)) is located to satisfy W (s(θc), τ(θc); θc) > W (s(θc), τ(θc); θc), then the original
policy set can be improved by including an iso-world-price segment between a new point (s0, τ 0) and (s(θc), τ(θc)) such
that W (s0, τ 0; θc) =W (s(θc), τ(θc); θc) and epw(s0, τ 0) = epw(s(θc), τ(θc)).
29If θc is indiﬀerent between (s(θc), τ(θc)) and (s(θc), τ(θc)), then epw(s(θc), τ(θc)) > epw(s(θc), τ(θc)); Lemma
4 (ii) implies epw(s(θc), τ(θc)) ≥ epw(s(θc), τ(θc)) for θc > θc, and if epw(s(θc), τ(θc)) = epw(s(θc), τ(θc)), then θc
cannot be indiﬀerent between the two.
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thus entails sorting for all θ ≤ θc along a new sorting segment,
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s(θc), τ(θc)) for s ≤ s(θc)}, (27)
and pooling at the policy mix (θc, 0) for all θ > θc.
Let ∆(θ) ≡WGA (·; θ)−WGO (·; θ), whereWGA (·; θ) andWGO (·; θ) represent the global welfare
under the alternative and original agreements, respectively. The global welfare is aﬀected
for θ ≤ θc and for θ ∈ (θc, θc): the alternative agreement shifts the original sorting segment
towards lower tariﬀs and brings the (global) welfare gain, ∆(θ) > 0, for θ ≤ θc, but it
causes the welfare loss, ∆(θ) < 0, for those types θ ∈ (θc, θc) that newly pool at (θc, 0).30
Observing that the alternative policy set approaches the original set as θc → θc, we may
diﬀerentiate Eθ∆(θ) with respect to θc and show that the alternative agreement improves on
the original agreement. If θc falls slightly from θc, then the marginal welfare gain associated
with the tariﬀ reduction for θ ≤ θc along the new sorting segment is strictly positive, but the
marginal welfare loss associated with the new pooling for θ ∈ (θc, θc) approaches zero, since
this welfare loss is measured on the original iso-world-price segment (26) where the foreign
welfare is held constant. Intuitively, the original policy choices, made along the original iso-
world-price segment, maximize the home welfare; the first-order diﬀerentiation of the home
welfare at the original policy choices is zero. If θc → θc, then for θ ∈ (θc, θc), the new pooling
point (θc, 0) approaches the original policy choices along the same segment; the first-order
diﬀerentiation of the home welfare at the new pooling point approaches zero. The marginal
home-welfare loss associated with the new pooling then approaches zero.
As we show in the Appendix, we may extend this result and show that an optimal agree-
ment cannot include any iso-world-price segment as its policy subset. This finding means
that any optimal agreement satisfies the following properties. First, on the sorting segment
present at the bottom, the world price is not constant but increasing in θ.31 The slope
at a policy mix is flatter on this sorting segment than on the associated iso-world-price
30If the alternative agreement is to shift the original segment without including the new pooling point (θc, 0)
on the original segment, then it will cause the welfare loss for types θ ∈ (θc, θ].
31This result holds for any sorting segment present at the bottom or potentially in other places. Observe also that the
sorting segment may not be too long; an alternative agreement would otherwise create the net global welfare gain by
shifting the segment towards lower tariﬀs and including a new jump and pooling. At the same time, however,
shortening the segment has a limitation; since the original segment is no longer an iso-world-price segment, the
marginal welfare loss associated with the new pooling does not approach zero for a slight jump.
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segment, other than at the policy mix for the lowest type 0 where the two slopes are the
same; thus, s(0) = 0 and s(θ) > θ for θ ∈ (0, θc). Second, the first-best intervention,
s(θ) = θ, is permitted not on subintervals of [0, θ] but only on points of the interval. In other
words, with respect to a measure μ, the targeting principle holds in a set of measure zero,
μ{θ : s(θ) = θ} = 0, and it does not hold outside a set of measure zero. We can thus say
that in its use of domestic subsidy, any optimal agreement violates the targeting principle
“almost everywhere” on the interval [0, θ].32 Third, two diﬀerent policy mixes deliver two
diﬀerent terms of trade for the foreign country: for θ2 > θ1, if (s(θ1), τ(θ1)) 6= (s(θ2), τ(θ2)),
then bpw(s(θ1), τ(θ1)) > bpw(s(θ2), τ(θ2)). Equivalently, given the monotonicity of the world
price, the equality, bpw(s(θ1), τ(θ1)) = bpw(s(θ2), τ(θ2)), cannot hold in an optimal agreement;
if it holds, the expected global welfare would be maximized by including an iso-world-price
segment between (s(θ1), τ(θ1)) and (s(θ2), τ(θ2)) that cannot exist in an optimal agreement.
We summarize our findings.
Proposition 5. (i) In its use of domestic subsidy, any optimal agreement violates the
targeting principle almost everywhere on the interval [0, θ]. (ii) In any optimal agreement,
an increase (a decrease) in domestic subsidy deteriorates (improves) the foreign country’s
terms of trade.
A proper treatment of subsidy implied by our finding contrasts with what is prescribed
by the targeting principle: the home government is not granted the freedom to select any
policies along an iso-world-price segment in any optimal agreement. The tension between
the objective of promoting domestic eﬃciency and the objective of reducing import tariﬀs is
resolved when an optimal agreement restricts the home government’s subsidy choice and thus
its use of first-best intervention. In this way, an optimal agreement respects terms of trade for
the foreign country and increases the market-access level for foreign exporters. Remember
also the GATT rules under which the treatment of domestic subsidies was tolerant and
focused on market access: subsequent to a tariﬀ negotiation, a governments was granted the
freedom to alter its domestic subsidies provided that such policy adjustments preserve market
access at the negotiated level. Our finding shows that the market-access focus of GATT rules
is not a proper restriction on subsidy choice; since any optimal agreement makes it impossible
32We can equivalently say that in its use of domestic subsidy, any optimal agreement almost surely violates the
targeting principle.
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for the home government to adjust its domestic subsidy without aﬀecting the market-access
level for foreign exporters, an optimal agreement can be achieved by a policy-mix agreement,
not by a commitment to a market-access level.
We finally present two additional points. First, we may numerically confirm that an
agreement can create the net global welfare gain by shifting an iso-world-price segment
towards lower tariﬀs and including a new jump and pooling. Suppose that θ is uniformly
distributed on [0, 1] with linear functions: D(pd) = 10 − pd and Q(ps) = 1
2
ps for the home
country and D∗(p∗d) = 10− p∗d and Q∗(p∗s) = p∗s for the foreign country.33 If an agreement
involves only one world price, then the optimal agreement within this class entails an iso-
world-price segment for θ ∈ [0, 0.68] and a pooling point (s, τ) = (0.68, 0). This agreement
can be improved by involving one jump: an iso-world-price segment for θ ∈ [0, 0.478] and a
pooling point (0.697, 0). This agreement can be further improved by including two jumps: an
iso-world-price segment for θ ∈ [0, 0.335] and two pooling points, (0.508, 0.052) and (0.705, 0).
Second, we next argue that our findings can be extended to a richer policy environment in
which a domestic consumption tax, t, is also available.34 The pricing equations in (1) then
becomes
pd = pw + τ + t and ps = pw + τ + s. (28)
The home welfare defined in (5) now includes an additional term for revenue from the
consumption tax, t ·D(bpd), and the home government has an additional instrument to lower
the world price:
∂bpw
∂t
= − D
0
D0 −Q0 − (Q∗0 −D∗0) < 0. (29)
Assuming that the welfare functions, W (s, τ , t; θ) and W ∗(s, τ , t), are strictly concave in
(s, τ , t), we can find that first-best and Nash policies take the same form as before: the con-
sumption tax remains unused (zero) for all θ in both policies. Consider next a hypothetical
agreement with the policy set:
{(s, τ , t) : bpw(s, τ , t) = bpw(s = θ, τ = 0, t = 0)}. (30)
The home government can then select any policy mix on the iso-world-price “plane” (30).
33We could numerically observe a similar pattern under diﬀerent forms of linear functions.
34The home government may impose an internal tax, th, on consumption of the domestically produced good and an
internal tax, tf , on consumption of the imported good. It then follows that pw = pd − τ − tf and ps = pd + s− th.
Following Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2010), we suppose that the WTO’s National Treatment Clause restricts the
relationship between th and tf to satisfy th = tf = t.
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This freedom ensures that the government follows the targeting principle to select its do-
mestic policies, s(θ) = θ and t(θ) = 0 for all θ, and tailors its tariﬀ level, τ(θ) = τ sep(θ),
to keep the world price at the specified level; despite the additional instrument, it prefers
to use only the policy mix (s, τ) along the iso-world-price function (10).35 Our argument
can be further generalized to show that the extra instrument is redundant: the addition of
the new instrument does not relax incentive compatibility to increase the expected global
welfare, and any optimal policy set can be constructed by (s, τ) only.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate how a domestic subsidy is treated, when a government can
disguise its protective use of subsidy as a legitimate intervention with which to address a
market imperfection in the import-competing sector. On the one hand, in common with
the existing literature, we show that any optimal agreement almost surely permits the use
of a positive domestic subsidy. This finding oﬀers an incomplete-information confirmation
that the virtual prohibition of domestic production subsidies seen in the legal environment
under WTO is beyond a proper level of restriction. On the other hand, as opposed to the
conventional prescription for the treatment of domestic subsidy, we show that any optimal
agreement almost surely prevents the use of the targeting principle. Whereas our basic
setting conveys fairly standard features commonly found in the existing literature, our finding
delivers a significantly diﬀerent message: an international agreement needs to restrict the
home government’s freedom to select its domestic subsidy in order to increase the market-
access level for foreign exporters. This finding provides an explanation for the international
trading system to depart from the fairly tolerant treatment of domestic subsidies shown
under GATT rules.
6 Appendix A: Preliminary Results36
We know from the market-clearing condition that
∂bpw
∂s
=
Q0
D0 −Q0 − (Q∗0 −D∗0) < 0 (A1)
∂bpw
∂τ
= − D
0 −Q0
D0 −Q0 − (Q∗0 −D∗0) < 0. (A2)
35This result is shown in Lemma A1 in the Appendix.
36These lengthy Appendices may be substantially shortened.
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Letting E∗(bpw) ≡ Q∗(bpw)−D∗(bpw), we can then show that the import volume decreases in
s and τ in equilibrium:
∂M
∂s
=
∂E∗
∂s
= (Q∗0 −D∗0)∂bpw
∂s
=
(Q∗0 −D∗0)Q0
D0 −Q0 − (Q∗0 −D∗0) < 0 (A3)
∂M
∂τ
=
∂E∗
∂τ
= (Q∗0 −D∗0)∂bpw
∂τ
= − (Q
∗0 −D∗0)(D0 −Q0)
D0 −Q0 − (Q∗0 −D∗0) < 0. (A4)
Using bps = bpw + τ + s, we can finally show that the domestic production of import good
increases in s and τ in equilibrium:
∂Q
∂s
= Q0
∂bps
∂s
=
Q0(D0 − (Q∗0 −D∗0))
D0 −Q0 − (Q∗0 −D∗0) > 0 (A5)
∂Q
∂τ
= Q0
∂bps
∂τ
= − Q
0(Q∗0 −D∗0)
D0 −Q0 − (Q∗0 −D∗0) > 0. (A6)
From (A1)-(A4), we find that
−∂bpw/∂s
∂bpw/∂τ = −∂M/∂s∂M/∂τ = Q0D0 −Q0 < 0. (A7)
We then obtain two findings: (i) if the world price bpw(s, τ) is constant in a policy set, then
the import volumeM(s, τ) is also constant in the set and (ii) the slope dτds is strictly negative
along the set.
First-Best and Nash Policies: We first find the first-best policy mix that maximizes
the global welfare WG(s, τ ; θ). Recall the pricing relationships: bpd(s, τ) = bpw(s, τ) + τ andbps(s, τ) = bpw(s, τ) + τ + s. Observe also that, for each policy instrument x ∈ {s, τ},
∂CS(bpd)
∂x
= CS0(bpd)∂bpd
∂x
= −D(bpd)∂bpd
∂x
∂Π(bps)
∂x
= Π0(bps)∂bps
∂x
= Q(bps)∂bps
∂x
.
Similarly, ∂CS
∗(epw)
∂x = −D∗(bpw)∂epw∂x and ∂Π∗(epw)∂x = Q∗(bpw)∂epw∂x . The first-order conditions
become
∂WG(s, τ ; θ)
∂x
= τ
∂M
∂x
+ [θ − s]∂Q
∂x
= 0 for x ∈ {s, τ}. (A8)
Hence, under Assumption 1 (i), WG(s, τ ; θ) is maximized when the home government with
type θ selects τ = 0 and s = θ. We next find the Nash policy mix that maximizes the home
welfare W (s, τ ; θ). The first-order conditions are
∂W (s, τ ; θ)
∂x
= −∂bpw
∂x
M + τ
∂M
∂x
+ [θ − s]∂Q
∂x
= 0 for x ∈ {s, τ}.
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These conditions are satisfied when
s = θ and τ =
∂bpw
∂τ
M
∂M/∂τ
=
∂bpw
∂s
M
∂M/∂s
=
E∗(bpw)
E∗0(bpw) .
The equality for τ is given by (A1)-(A4).
Single-Crossing Property: To show that the property holds in the home iso-welfare
function {(s, τ) : W (s, τ ; θ) = κ for a constant κ}, we refer to the gradient vector of the
function:
∇(θ) ≡
µ
∂W (s, τ ; θ)/∂s
∂W (s, τ ; θ)/∂τ
¶
.
Using the first-order conditions shown above, we can find the diﬀerentiation of the gradient
vector with respect to θ:
∂∇(θ)
∂θ
=
µ
∂Q/∂s
∂Q/∂τ
¶
.
We know from (A5) and (A6) that ∂Q∂s >
∂Q
∂τ > 0 at any policy mix. Thus, for any θ1
and θ2 where θ2 > θ1, the iso-welfare function for θ2 crosses the iso-welfare function for θ1
from above only once if it crosses. If the function v takes the general form v(Q, θ) without
Assumption 1 (ii), then the corresponding diﬀerentiation becomes
∂∇(θ)
∂θ
=
Ã
∂2v
∂θ∂Q
∂Q
∂s
∂2v
∂θ∂Q
∂Q
∂τ
!
.
Since ∂
2v
∂θ∂Q
∂Q
∂s >
∂2v
∂θ∂Q
∂Q
∂τ > 0 at any policy mix under the assumption
∂2v
∂θ∂Q > 0, the single-
crossing property again holds.
7 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. We maximize the home welfare W (s, τ ; θ) subject to the constraint:bpw(s, τ) is constant at bpw(s = θ, τ = 0). The constraint can be represented by an iso-world-
price function, τ = τ(s). We plug the constraint into the home welfare:
W (s, τ(s); θ) ≡ CS(bpd) +Π(bps) + τ(s) ·M(s, τ(s))− s ·Q(bps) + θ ·Q(bps),
where bpd = bpw(s, τ(s)) + τ(s) and bps = bpw(s, τ(s)) + τ(s) + s. Using ∂CS(epd)∂s = −D(bpd)∂epd∂s
and ∂Π(ep
s)
∂x = Q(bps)∂eps∂s , we find the diﬀerentiation:
∂W (s, τ(s); θ)
∂s
= [Q−D]
∙
∂bpw
∂τ
dτ
∂s
+
∂bpw
∂s
¸
+τ
∂M
∂τ
dτ
ds
+τ
∂M
∂s
+[θ−s]
∙
∂Q
∂τ
dτ
ds
+
∂Q
∂s
¸
. (A9)
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We know from (A7) that the slope of the iso-world-price function is
dτ
∂s
= −∂bpw/∂s
∂bpw/∂τ = −∂M/∂s∂M/∂τ .
The RHS of (A9) is thus reduced to the last term:
∂W (s, τ(s); θ)
∂s
= [θ − s]
∙
∂Q
∂τ
dτ
ds
+
∂Q
∂s
¸
= [θ − s] Q
0D0
D0 −Q0 . (A10)
The second equality is given by (A5)-(A7). Since Q
0D0
D0−Q0 > 0,
∂W (s,τ(s);θ)
∂s < 0 for s > θ and
∂W (s,τ(s);θ)
∂s > 0 for s < θ. Hence, the home government with type θ selects its subsidy s = θ.
¥
Proof of Lemma 3. In the policy set (13), a slight increase in κ from zero preserves the
same subsidy choice, s(θ) = θ, while it raises τ(θ) for all θ. It thus lowers the world price
for all θ, which in turn decreases the foreign welfare for all θ:
dW ∗(s, τ)
dbpw = −D∗(bpw) +Q∗(bpw) = E∗(bpw) > 0.
The inequality, E∗(bpw) > 0, is given by the assumption 1 (iii),M(s = θ, τ = 0) > 0. Further,
given s(θ) = θ, it follows that
∂WG(s(θ), τ ; θ)
∂τ
= τ
∂M
∂τ
< 0 for any τ > 0.
Hence, if κ rises from zero, then the global welfare falls for all θ. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider an alternative agreement with the policy set (14):
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θc, τ = 0) for θc ∈ θc, θ)}.
The set can be represented by a strictly decreasing function, τ = τ(s):
τ(s) =
dτ
ds
[s− θc] = Q
0
D0 −Q0 [s− θ
c] > 0. (A11)
The slope, dτds =
Q0
D0−Q0 < 0, is determined by (A1) and (A2). This agreement entails pooling
at (θc, 0) for θ ≥ θc: for θ ∈ [θc, θ], s(θ) = θc and τ(θ) = 0. It also involves sorting for θ < θc:
for θ ∈ [0, θc), s(θ) = θ and τ(θ) is determined by the function τ = τ(s). The expected
global welfare under the alternative agreement isZ θc
0
WG(s(θ), τ(θ); θ)dF (θ) +
Z θ
θc
WG(s = θc, τ = 0; θ)dF (θ). (A12)
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Since WG(s(θc), τ(θc); θc) = WG(s = θc, τ = 0; θc) by construction, the diﬀerentiation of
(A12) with respect to θc is reduced to two terms:Z θc
0
∂WG(s(θ), τ(θ); θ)
∂θc
dF (θ) +
Z θ
θc
∂WG(s = θc, τ = 0; θ)
∂θc
dF (θ). (A13)
We first show that, for θ ∈ [0, θc), the global welfare WG(s(θ), τ(θ); θ) falls if the iso-world-
price function in (A11) shifts up as θc rises. Since an increase in θc raises the tariﬀ choice
τ(θ) and keeps the same subsidy choice, s(θ) = θ, for θ ∈ [0, θc), we may rewrite the first
integrand in (A13) as
∂WG(s(θ), τ(θ); θ)
∂θc
=
∂WG(s(θ), τ(θ); θ)
∂τ
dτ(θ)
dθc
= τ(θ)
∂M
∂τ
dτ(θ)
dθc
(A14)
= −
µ
Q0
D0 −Q0
¶2
[θ − θc]∂M
∂τ
< 0.
The second equality is given by (A8) and the third equality by (A11). The first term of
(A13) is thus negative. We next show that the second term of (A12) is positive. Since in the
pooling interval, an increase in θc raises the subsidy choice, s(θ) = θc, and keeps the same
tariﬀ, τ(θ) = 0, we may rewrite the second integrand in (A13) as
∂WG(s = θc, τ = 0; θ)
∂θc
= [θ − θc]∂Q
∂θc
> 0 for θ > θc. (A15)
The equality is given by (A8). If θc → θ, then (A15) approaches zero while (A14) remains
strictly negative: if θc decreases slightly from θ, then the expected global welfare in (A12) in-
creases. Hence, the separating agreement can be improved upon by the alternative agreement
that entails pooling at the top for θ ∈ [θc, θ]. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. We here show that an agreement is not optimal when the
policy set is {(s1, 0), (s2, 0)} where s1 = 0. We consider two possibilities: (i) (0, 0) is selected
only by the lowest type 0 and (ii) (0, 0) is selected by types θ ∈ [0,bθ] where bθ > 0. We first
show that the original policy set under (i) can be improved on by an alternative policy set:
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = s2, τ = 0)}. (A16)
The alternative set entails sorting for θ ≤ s2 and pooling at (s2, 0) for θ > s2. We restrict
attention to s2 < θ; if s2 ≥ θ, then it is immediate from the argument stated below that
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the agreement under (i) is not optimal. The global welfare is aﬀected for θ ∈ [0, s2) by
the change of policy set. For θ ∈ (0, s2), the sorting segment (A16) generates higher global
welfare than does the original policy set by increasing the home welfare while preserving the
world price bpw(s = s2, τ = 0). Hence, given prob(θ = 0) = 0, the expected global welfare is
higher in the alternative agreement than in the original agreement.
We next show that the original policy set under (ii) is not optimal. We restrict attention
to bθ ∈ (0, θ); if bθ > θ, then the policy set is equivalent to a singleton that is not optimal.
Pick a subsidy bs ∈ (0,bθ) and develop an alternative policy set {(bs, 0), (s2, 0)}. This new set
entails pooling at (bs, 0) for θ ∈ [0,bθ]: since (0, 0) and (s2, 0) are indiﬀerent for type bθ in the
original set, it is immediate that (bs, 0) is preferred to (s2, 0) for types θ ≤ bθ in the new set.
Some types θ > bθ also select (bs, 0) in the new set; the associated home-welfare gain by those
types raises the world price and thus the foreign welfare for those types. It thus suﬃces to
show that the global welfare in the range [0,bθ) is higher in the alternative set than in the
original set. Since the policy point (bs, 0) is fixed for θ ∈ [0,bθ], we findZ eθ
0
WG(s = bs, τ = 0; θ)dF (θ) =WG(s = bs, τ = 0;Z eθ
0
θdF (θ)).
This value is maximized when bs = R eθ
0
θdF (θ). When developing the alternative set, we can
always set bs = R eθ
0
θdF (θ). The expected global welfare is then higher in the alternative set
than in the original set. This alternative set can be further improved by including a sorting
segment at the bottom:
{{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = bs, τ = 0)}, (s2, 0)}.
Hence, the original agreement is not optimal. ¥
Proof of Lemma 4. We here show that, in any optimal agreement, bpw(s(θ2), τ(θ2)) ≤bpw(s(θ1), τ(θ1)) for any θ2 > θ1. Assume that an optimal agreement allows bpw(s(θ2), τ(θ2)) >bpw(s(θ1), τ(θ1)) for some θ2 > θ1. Without loss of generality, we assume that there exists
type θc < θ1 such that bpw(s(θc), τ(θc)) ≥ bpw(s(θ), τ(θ)) for all θ ∈ [0, θ], and also thatbpw(s(θ2), τ(θ2)) ≥ bpw(s(θ), τ(θ)) for any θ > θc. The monotonicity of subsidy choice then
implies
s(θc) ≤ s(θ1) ≤ s(θ2).
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Pick the policy mix (s2, τ 2) that maximizes bpw(s, τ) on the iso-welfare function for θ2:
{(s, τ) :W (s, τ ; θ2) =W (s(θ2), τ(θ2); θ2)}. (A17)
The world price on (A17) is maximized when the iso-world-price function, {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) =
κ for a constant κ > 0}, shifts down either (a) until it is tangent to (A17) or (b) until it
crosses (A17) from below at zero tariﬀ. We can then show that
s(θ1) < s2 ≤ θ2.
The second inequality is immediate: s2 = θ2 under (a) and s2 < θ2 under (b). To show
that the first inequality holds, suppose s2 ≤ s(θ1). Then s2 ≤ s(θ1) ≤ s(θ2) by the
monotonicity. Given that (s2, τ 2) and (s(θ2), τ(θ2)) are located on the same iso-welfare
function for θ2 in (A17), the above assumption, bpw(s(θ2), τ(θ2)) > bpw(s(θ1), τ(θ1)), implies
that (s(θ1), τ(θ1)) is preferred to (s(θ2), τ(θ2)) for type θ2, which violates incentive compati-
bility. Hence, s2 > s(θ1) holds. We below develop an alternative agreement under two cases:
(i) bpw(s(θc), τ(θc)) ≤ bpw(s2, τ 2) and (ii) bpw(s(θc), τ(θc)) > bpw(s2, τ 2).
Case (i): We develop an alternative policy set that includes a sorting segment at the bottom
up to the point (s2, τ 2):
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s2, τ 2) for all s ≤ s2}. (A18)
The policy subset for s > s2 remains the same. We first show that incentive compatibility
for types θ ≤ s2 holds. The policy mix (s2, τ 2) on (A17) and any policy mix for s > s2 is in
the region {(s, τ) : W (s, τ ; θ2) ≤ W (s(θ2), τ(θ2); θ2)}. Given s2 ≤ θ2 as shown above, types
θ ≤ s2 do not mimic types θ > s2 and make their policy choices along the segment (A18);
hence, s(θ) = θ for all θ ≤ s2. We next show that incentive compatibility for θ > s2 can
be ignored: if some types θ > s2 have incentive to mimic types θ ≤ s2, then the associated
home-welfare increase does not lower the foreign welfare for any θ, since the segment (A18)
involves the highest possible world price bpw(s2, τ 2). Therefore, in order to show that the
alternative agreement improves the expected global welfare, it suﬃces to show that, for the
range [0, s2], the global welfare is higher in the alternative agreement than in the original
agreement: Z s2
0
WGA (·; θ)dF (θ) >
Z s2
0
WGO (·; θ)dF (θ)
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where WGA (·; θ) and WGO (·; θ) represent the global welfare under the alternative and original
agreements, respectively. Observe that the sorting segment (A18) extends beyond the point
(s(θ1), τ(θ1)) at the higher world price bpw(s2, τ 2) > bpw(s(θ1), τ(θ1)), given s(θ1) < s2 and
the assumption bpw(s(θ2), τ(θ2)) > bpw(s(θ1), τ(θ1)). This result ensures that, in the original
agreement, some θ ≤ s2 selected their policies not from the segment (A18) but from the
region in which the world price is lower than bpw(s2, τ 2). Thus, inclusion of the sorting
segment (A18) increases the global welfare for the range [0, s2] and so the original agreement
is not optimal, which causes a contradiction.
Case (ii): In this case, the iso-world-price function, {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s2, τ 2)}, crosses
the iso-welfare function for θc, {(s, τ) : W (s, τ ; θc) = W (s(θc), τ(θc); θc)}. Pick the crossing
point (sc, τ c) that satisfies
bpw(sc, τ c) = bpw(s2, τ 2) and W (sc, τ c; θc) =W (s(θc), τ(θc); θc) where sc > θc.
We next observe that
θc < sc < s(θ1) < s2 ≤ θ2. (A19)
All inequalities are given above other than sc < s(θ1). This inequality is given by construc-
tion, since (s(θ1), τ(θ1)) satisfies
W (s(θ1), τ(θ1); θc) ≤ W (sc, τ c; θc) =W (s(θc), τ(θc); θc) (A20)bpw(s(θ1), τ(θ1)) < bpw(sc, τ c) = bpw(s2, τ 2).
The first inequality is incentive compatibility of θc. The second inequality is given by the
above assumption, bpw(s(θ2), τ(θ2)) > bpw(s(θ1), τ(θ1)).
We now construct an alternative policy set that contains the sorting segment:
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s2, τ 2) for all s ∈ [sc, s2]}. (A21)
The policy subset for s /∈ [sc, s2] remains the same. This segment involves the highest possible
world price for all θ > θc. We next check incentive compatibility. The segment is arranged
to make type θc indiﬀerent between (s(θc), τ(θc)) and (sc, τ c) and so types θ ∈ (θc, sc) pool
at (sc, τ c). We also know that (s2, τ 2) is on the iso-welfare function for θ2 in (A17), and the
policy subset for s > s2 is in {(s, τ) :W (s, τ ; θ2) ≤W (s(θ2), τ(θ2); θ2)}. Thus, given s2 ≤ θ2,
types θ ∈ [sc, s2] do not mimic types θ > s2 but make their choices along the sorting segment
(A21).
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We finally show that, for the aﬀected range (θc, s2], the global welfare is higher in the
alternative agreement than in the original agreement. Consider first types θ ∈ [sc, s2].
Together with sc < s(θ1) < s2 in (A19), the last inequality in (A20) ensures that, in the
original agreement, some θ ∈ [sc, s2] selected their policies not from the sorting segment
(A21) but from the region in which the world price is lower than bpw(s2, τ 2). Hence,Z s2
sc
WGA (·; θ)dF (θ) >
Z s2
sc
WGO (·; θ)dF (θ).
Consider next types θ ∈ (θc, sc). In the original agreement, the policy mixes for the aﬀected
types θ ∈ (θc, s2] are in the region:
{(s, τ) :W (s, τ ; θc) ≤W (s(θc), τ(θc); θc) and bpw(s, τ) ≤ bpw(sc, τ c)}.
Any (s, τ) in this region satisfies s ≥ sc. Thus, for θ ∈ (θc, sc), any original policy mix takes
the form of over-subsidy, s(θ) > θ, and involves a weekly lower world price than does the
sorting scheme in (A21). Hence, for any original policy mix (s(θ), τ(θ)) for θ ∈ (θc, sc), there
exist (bs,bτ) such that bs = s(θ) and bτ ≤ τ(θ) on the sorting segment:
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s2, τ 2) for s ≥ sc}. (A22)
We now follow three logical steps. First, if any policy mix takes the form of over-subsidy,
then a decrease in tariﬀ increases the global welfare:
∂WG(s, τ ; θ)
∂τ
= τ
∂M
∂τ
+ [θ − s]∂Q
∂τ
< 0 for any s > θ. (A23)
Second, we compare two scenarios: (a) given the original mix (s(θ), τ(θ)), the home govern-
ment with θ ∈ (θc, sc) is “restricted” to select bs = s(θ) and bτ ≤ τ(θ) from the set (A22),
and (b) the home government with θ ∈ (θc, sc) is allowed to select any policy mix from the
set (A22) with no such restriction. The home welfare is at least as high under (b) as under
(a), while the foreign welfare is the same in both cases. To summarize the two results, for
θ ∈ (θc, sc), the global welfare is at least as high in (A22) as in the original agreement.
Third, for θ ∈ (θc, sc), both (A21) and (A22) entail pooling at the same point (sc, τ c) and
thus generate the same global welfare. Finally, for the entire aﬀected range (θc, s2], we can
compare the global welfare:Z s2
θc
WGA (·; θ)dF (θ) >
Z s2
θc
WGO (·; θ)dF (θ).
Hence, the original agreement is not optimal, which causes a contradiction. ¥
37
Proof of Proposition 3. Given that s(0) = 0 and τ(0) > 0 by Lemma 5, we show that
an optimal agreement cannot entail pooling at (s(0), τ(0)) for θ ∈ [0, θ0] for some θ0 > 0.
Suppose that an optimal agreement entails such a pooling interval. The policy mixes for
θ > θ0 are in the region {(s, τ) :W (s, τ ; θ0) ≤W (s(0), τ(0); θ0)}. Pick the policy mix (s0, τ 0)
that maximizes bpw(s, τ) on the iso-welfare function for θ0:
{(s, τ) :W (s, τ ; θ0) =W (s(0), τ(0); θ0)}. (A24)
The world price on (A24) is maximized when the iso-world-price function shifts down either
(i) until it is tangent to (A24) or (ii) until it crosses (A24) at zero tariﬀ. It then follows that
0 < s0 ≤ θ0.
The second inequality is immediate: s0 = θ0 under (i) and s0 < θ0 under (ii). Under (i), the
first inequality is given by s0 = θ0 and θ0 > 0. Under (ii), given s(0) = 0, if s0 = 0, then
τ(0) = 0, which is impossible by Lemma 5, and so s0 > 0.
We now construct an alternative policy set that contains a sorting segment at the bottom
up to (s0, τ 0):
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s0, τ 0) for all s ≤ s0}. (A25)
The policy subset for s > s0 remains the same. We next check incentive compatibility of
the alternative agreement. The policy mix (s0, τ 0) on (A24) and any policy mix for s > s0
is in the region {(s, τ) : W (s, τ ; θ0) ≤ W (s(0), τ(0); θ0)}. Thus, given s0 ≤ θ0 as shown
above, types θ ≤ s0 do not mimic types θ > s0 but select their policies along the sorting
segment (A25): s(θ) = θ for all θ ≤ s0. The incentive of types θ > s0 to mimic types θ ≤ s0
can be ignored: the associated home-welfare gain does not cause a fall in the world price,
since the original agreement satisfies the monotonicity: bpw(s0, τ 0) ≥ bpw(s(θ), τ(θ)) for all θ.
Therefore, inclusion of the sorting segment (A25) increases the global welfare for θ ≤ s0 and
so the original agreement is not optimal, which causes a contradiction. ¥
Proof of Lemma 6. We show that, in any optimal agreement, for any θ, if τ(θ) > 0,
then (s(θ), τ(θ)) is in the region:
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) > bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}. (A26)
Assume that an optimal agreement allows τ(θ) > 0 and bpw(s(θ), τ(θ)) ≤ bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)
for some θ > 0. Lemma 5 implies that there exists typebθ = sup{θ : bpw(s(θ), τ(θ)) > bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}
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such that (i) the iso-welfare function for bθ, {(s, τ) : W (s, τ ;bθ) = W (s(bθ), τ(bθ);bθ)}, crosses
the iso-world-price function, {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}, from below at a strictly
positive tariﬀ, or (ii) it crosses the zero-tariﬀ line, {(s, τ) : τ = 0}. For those two cases, we
show that the original agreement is not optimal, which causes a contradiction.
Case (i): Pick the crossing point (bs,bτ) that satisfies
W (bs,bτ ;bθ) =W (s(bθ), τ(bθ);bθ) and bpw(bs,bτ) = bpw(s = θ, τ = 0).
We may consider two possibilities: (a) (bs,bτ) 6= (s(bθ), τ(bθ)) and (b) (bs,bτ) = (s(bθ), τ(bθ)). The
case (a) occurs when the point (s(bθ), τ(bθ)) is located within the region (A26), which meansbpw(s(bθ), τ(bθ)) > bpw(s = θ, τ = 0). The case (b) occurs when (s(bθ), τ(bθ)) is located on the
iso-world-price function {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}. In particular, this case occurs
when the policy subset adjoining the point (s(bθ), τ(bθ)) from the left is continuous and is
flatter than the iso-world-price function.
We first consider the case (a). From the definition of (bs,bτ), it follows that bθ < bs. Observe
also that the original agreement places any policy mix for s ≥ bs in the region:
{(s, τ) :W (s, τ ;bθ) ≤W (s(bθ), τ(bθ);bθ) and bpw(s, τ) ≤ bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}. (A27)
We now construct an alternative policy set that includes a sorting segment at the top from
the point (bs,bτ):
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θ, τ = 0) for s ≥ bs}. (A28)
The policy subset for s < bs remains the same. The alternative agreement entails pooling
for θ ∈ (bθ, bs) at (bs,bτ) and sorting for θ ∈ [bs, θ] along the set (A28). For the aﬀected types
θ ∈ (bθ, θ], the global welfare is at least as high in the alternative agreement as in the original
agreement. For θ ∈ [bs, θ], the alternative agreement involves sorting at a weakly higher world
price and thus generates at least as high global welfare as the original agreement does. For
θ ∈ (bθ, bs), the original agreement entails over-subsidy, s(θ) > θ, and involves a weekly lower
world price than does the alternative agreement. Adopting the argument used in the proof of
Lemma 4, we can confirm that, for θ ∈ (bθ, bs), the alternative agreement generates at least as
high global welfare as the original agreement. In order to show that the original agreement
is not optimal, it now suﬃces to show that the alternative agreement is further improved on
by a new policy set.
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Suppose that the new policy set contains the new sorting segment for s > bs0 at the world
price that is higher than bpw(s = θ, τ = 0):
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θc, τ = 0) for s ≥ bs0}, (A29)
where θc < θ and bs0 < bs. The policy subset for s < bs0 remains the same. Pick the new
crossing point (bs0,bτ 0) that satisfies
W (bs0,bτ 0;bθ) =W (s(bθ), τ(bθ);bθ) and bpw(bs0,bτ 0) = bpw(s = θc, τ = 0).
This policy set entails pooling for θ ∈ (bθ, bs0) at (bs0,bτ 0), sorting for θ ∈ [bs0, θc) along (A29)
and pooling at (θc, 0) for θ ∈ [θc, θ]. Again, the pooling for θ ∈ (bθ, bs0) causes over-subsidy.
Observing that, if θc → θ, then (bs0,bτ 0)→ (bs,bτ) and so (A29) approaches (A28), we diﬀeren-
tiate the expected global welfare with respect to θc. The diﬀerentiation is reduced to three
terms:Z es0
eθ
∂WG(bs0,bτ 0; θ)
∂θc
dF (θ) +
Z θc
es0
∂WG(s(θ), τ(θ); θ)
∂θc
dF (θ) +
Z θ
θc
∂WG(s = θc, τ = 0; θ)
∂θc
dF (θ).
(A30)
As seen in (A13) in the proof of Proposition 1, if θc → θ, then the second term in (A30)
remains negative and the third term approaches zero. We can thus claim that, if the first
term is negative for θc close to θ, then the expected global welfare is higher with (A29)
than with (A28). To show that this claim holds, we show that, if θc falls slightly from θ,
then for θ ∈ (bθ, bs0), the global welfare is higher at the new pooling point (bs0,bτ 0) than at the
previous pooling point (bs,bτ). We follow three steps. First, if any policy mix takes the form
of over-subsidy, then a decrease in tariﬀ increases the global welfare: ∂W
G(s,τ ;θ)
∂τ < 0 for any
s > θ as shown in (A23). Second, we compare two scenarios: (c) the home government with
θ ∈ (bθ, bs0) is “restricted” to select a point (bs,eτ) from the segment (A29), where eτ < bτ , and
(d) the home government with θ ∈ (bθ, bs0) is allowed to select any policy mix from (A29) with
no such restriction. For θ ∈ (bθ, bs0), the global welfare is at least as high under (d) as under
(c); for θ ∈ (bθ, bs0), the home welfare is at least as high under (d) as under (c), while the
foreign welfare is the same in both scenarios. To summarize the two steps, for θ ∈ (bθ, bs0),
the global welfare is higher under (d) than at the pooling point (bs,bτ), since tariﬀs are lower
at (bs,eτ) than at (bs,bτ). Third, under the scenario (d), the home government with θ ∈ (bθ, bs0)
selects the pooling point (bs0,bτ 0). Hence, the above claim holds.
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We next consider the case (b) in which (bs,bτ) = (s(bθ), τ(bθ)). Again, the original agreement
entails an over-subsidy interval: there exist types θ ∈ (bθ, bs) that select their policies from the
region (A27) for s ≥ bs = s(bθ). The remaining proof is analogous to the proof for the case
(a), except that the crossing point in (A29), (bs0,bτ 0), is now defined as the point at which the
iso-world-price segment (A29) crosses the original policy subset that is continuous, adjoining
(bs,bτ) from the left. ¥
Case (ii): The iso-welfare function {(s, τ) :W (s, τ ;bθ) =W (s(bθ), τ(bθ);bθ)} crosses the zero-
tariﬀ line under the two possibilities: (a) it crosses the zero-tariﬀ line only once and (b) it
has two crossing points, (s1, 0) and (s2, 0) where s2 > s1, such that
W (s1, 0;bθ) =W (s2, 0;bθ) =W (s(bθ), τ(bθ);bθ).
The case (a) occurs when the iso-welfare function is tangent to the zero-tariﬀ line at (θ, 0);
if the tangent point is not (θ, 0), then the iso-welfare function crosses {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) =bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)} from below at a positive tariﬀ, which corresponds to the case (i) seen
above. The case (b) occurs when s1 ≤ θ ≤ s2; if s1 > θ or s2 < θ, then the iso-welfare
function crosses {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)} from below at a positive tariﬀ, which
corresponds to the case (i).
Consider first the case (a). Any policy mix (s, τ) that involves a positive tariﬀ τ > 0 andbpw(s, τ) ≤ bpw(s = θ, τ = 0) is in the region:
{(s, τ) :W (s, τ ;bθ) ≤W (s = θ, τ = 0;bθ) and bpw(s, τ) ≤ bpw(s = θ, τ = 0)}. (A31)
Any policy mix (s, τ) with τ > 0 in (A31) is improved on by the zero-tariﬀ point (θ, 0); the
global welfare for any θ is higher at (θ, 0) than at any policy mix (s, τ) with τ > 0, since for
any θ, the over-subsidy is smaller and tariﬀ is lower at (θ, 0) than at any other policy mix
(s, τ) with τ > 0 in (A31). Consider next the case (b). Any policy mix (s, τ) that involves
τ > 0 and bpw(s, τ) ≤ bpw(s = θ, τ = 0) is in the region:
{(s, τ) :W (s, τ ;bθ) ≤W (s = s2, τ = 0;bθ) and bpw(s, τ) ≤ bpw(s = s2, τ = 0)}. (A32)
For the same reason as above, any policy mix (s, τ) with τ > 0 in (A32) is improved on by
the zero-tariﬀ point (s2, 0). ¥
Proof of Proposition 5. We here show that an optimal policy set cannot include a sort-
ing segment in which the world price is constant. First, we show that an optimal agreement
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cannot have an iso-world-price segment at the bottom. Suppose that an optimal agreement
entails sorting at the bottom for θ ≤ θc along an iso-world-price segment {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) =bpw(s(θc), τ(θc))}. We know from the text that an optimal policy set, involving more than
one world price, includes a jump at (s(θc), τ(θc)) such that type θc is indiﬀerent between
(s(θc), τ(θc)) and (s1, τ 1); types θ ∈ (θc, s1) pool at (s1, τ 1). We develop an alternative set
in which another jump at (s(θ0c), τ(θ
0
c)) is made such that type θ
0
c < θc is indiﬀerent between
(s(θ0c), τ(θ
0
c)) and (s(θc), τ(θc)). This alternative scheme thus entails sorting for θ ∈ [0, θ0c]
along a new sorting segment {(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s(θ0c), τ(θ0c))}, pooling at (s(θc), τ(θc))
for θ ∈ (θ0c, θc) and pooling at (s1, τ 1) for θ ∈ (θc, s1). Let ∆(θ) ≡ WGA (·; θ) − WGO (·; θ)
where WGA (·; θ) and WGO (·; θ) represent the global welfare under the alternative and original
agreements, respectively. It follows that ∆(θ) > 0 for θ < θ0c, ∆(θ) < 0 for θ ∈ (θ0c, θc) and
∆(θ) = 0 for θ ≥ θc. We find that the diﬀerentiation of Eθ∆(θ) with respect to θ0c is reduced
to two terms: Z θ0c
0
∂∆(θ)
∂θ0c
dF (θ) +
Z θc
θ0c
∂∆(θ)
∂θ0c
dF (θ).
If θ0c falls slightly from θc, then import tariﬀs for θ ∈ [0, θ0c] falls along the new sorting
segment where s(θ) = θ. Hence, if θ0c → θc, then ∆(θ)→ 0 and ∂∆(θ)∂θ0c < 0 for θ ∈ [0, θ
0
c]. This
strict inequality is given by the single-crossing property: if θ0c falls slightly from θc, then the
iso-welfare function for θ0c, {(s, τ) : W (s, τ ; θ0c) = W (s(θc), τ(θc); θ0c)}, pivots on the point
(s(θc), τ(θc)) counterclockwise. This is evident, since the gradient vector of the home welfare
function, ∇(θ), at the point (s(θc), τ(θc)) has the diﬀerentiation:
∂∇(θ)
∂θ
¯¯¯¯
θ=θc
=
µ
∂Q/∂s
∂Q/∂τ
¶¯¯¯¯
(s,τ)=(s(θc),τ(θc))
where ∂Q∂s >
∂Q
∂τ > 0 at (s(θc), τ(θc)). On the other hand, if θ
0
c falls slightly from θc, then
the marginal welfare loss associated with the new pooling point (s(θc), τ(θc)),
∂∆(θ)
∂θ0c
for
θ ∈ (θ0c, θc), approaches zero. To see this, suppose that a function, τ = τ(s), represents the
original sorting segment where the foreign welfare is held constant. Along this segment, the
original policy mix for θ ∈ (θ0c, θc) maximizes the home welfare and satisfies the first-order
condition in (A10):
∂W (s, τ(s); θ)
∂s
= [θ − s] Q
0D0
D0 −Q0 = 0.
For θ ∈ (θ0c, θc), if θ0c → θc, then the new pooling point approaches the original policy
mix along the original segment; the first-order diﬀerentiation of the home welfare at the new
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pooling point approaches zero, which implies that the marginal home-welfare loss approaches
zero. Hence, if θ0c → θc, then ∆(θ) → 0 and ∂∆(θ)∂θ0c → 0 for θ ∈ (θ
0
c, θc). In summary, if θ
0
c
falls slightly from θc, then Eθ∆(θ) increases, which contradicts the optimality of the original
agreement.
Second, we extend this result beyond the interval at the bottom, [0, θc]. Suppose that
an optimal policy set includes a sorting segment as a policy subset for θ ∈ (θ1, θ2) in which
the world price is constant and s(θ) = θ. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
continuous policy subset for θ ∈ [0, θc] in which the world price is now strictly increasing is
followed by the sorting segment for θ ∈ (θ1, θ2):
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s(θ2), τ(θ2)) for s ∈ [s(θ1), s(θ2)]}. (A33)
The policy set then generates pooling for θ ∈ (θc, θ1) such that θc is indiﬀerent between
(s(θc), τ(θc)) and (s(θ1), τ(θ1)). As in the proof of Lemma 6, we may consider two possi-
bilities: (i) (s(θc), τ(θc)) 6= (s(θ1), τ(θ1)) and (ii) (s(θc), τ(θc)) = (s(θ1), τ(θ1)). The case (i)
occurs when the policy set involves a jump at (s(θc), τ(θc)), and the case (ii) occurs when
the policy subset adjoining the point (s(θc), τ(θc)) from the left is continuous and is flatter
than the iso-world-price segment (A33).
For the case (i), we shift the segment (A33) down, and develop an alternative policy set
in which a small jump at (s(θ02), τ(θ
0
2)) is made such that type θ
0
2 < θ2 is indiﬀerent between
(s(θ02), τ(θ
0
2)) and (s(θ2), τ(θ2)). The new policy set then causes the diﬀerence: it entails
pooling at (s(θ01), τ(θ
0
1)) for θ ∈ (θc, θ01), sorting for θ ∈ [θ01, θ02] along a new sorting segment,
{(s, τ) : bpw(s, τ) = bpw(s(θ02), τ(θ02)) for s ∈ [s(θ01), s(θ02)]}, (A34)
and pooling at (s(θ2), τ(θ2)) for θ ∈ [θ02, θ2]. An endpoint in (A34), (s(θ01), τ(θ01)), is defined
by
W (s(θ01), τ(θ
0
1); θc) =W (s(θc), τ(θc); θc) and bpw(s(θ01), τ(θ01)) = bpw(s(θ02), τ(θ02)).
Note that the world price is higher in (A34) than in the original segment (A33), and also
that over-subsidy (s(θ) > θ) occurs in the pooling interval for θ ∈ (θc, θ01). Defining ∆(θ)
as above, we find that ∆(θ) > 0 for θ ∈ (θc, θ01), ∆(θ) > 0 for θ ∈ [θ01, θ02] and ∆(θ) < 0 for
θ ∈ [θ02, θ2]. The result, ∆(θ) > 0 for θ ∈ (θc, θ01), is immediate from the proof of Lemma 6:
for θ ∈ (θc, θ01), the alternative agreement involves a lower domestic distortion in the form
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of over-subsidy at a higher world price than does the original agreement. We next find that
diﬀerentiation of Eθ∆(θ) with respect to θ02 is reduced toZ θ01
θc
∂∆(θ)
∂θ02
dF (θ) +
Z θ02
θ01
∂∆(θ)
∂θ02
dF (θ) +
Z θ2
θ02
∂∆(θ)
∂θ02
dF (θ).
If θ02 → θ2, then the first two terms remain negative, but the third (positive) term approaches
zero; as we show above, if θ02 falls slightly from θ2, the marginal welfare loss for θ ∈ (θ02, θ2)
associated with the new pooling at (s(θ02), τ(θ
0
2)) approaches zero. Hence, if θ
0
2 falls slightly
from θ2, then Eθ∆(θ) increases, which contradicts the optimality assumption.
The remaining proof for the case (ii) is analogous, except that the endpoint in (A34),
(s(θ01), τ(θ
0
1)), is now defined as the point at which the new sorting scheme (A34) crosses the
original policy subset that adjoins (s(θc), τ(θc)) from the left. ¥
Lemma A1. In the policy set (30), the home government of type θ selects s(θ) = θ, t(θ) = 0
and τ(θ) = τ sep(θ).
Proof. We maximize W (s, τ , t; θ) subject to the constraint: bpw(s, τ , t) is constant atbpw(s = θ, τ = 0, t = 0). The first-order conditions become
−∂bpw
∂x
M + τ
∂M
∂x
+ [θ − s]∂Q
∂x
+ t
∂D
∂x
− λ∂bpw
∂x
= 0 for x ∈ {s, τ , t}
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Observe λ < 0 under Assumption 2, whereby the
home welfare falls as the iso-world-price function shifts to raise bpw. Since ∂M∂x = E∗0 ∂epw∂x for
x ∈ {s, τ , t}, the first-order conditions imply s = θ, t = 0 and τ = E∗(epw)+λE∗0(epw) . Hence, on
the iso-world-price plane (30), the home government of type θ uses the targeting principle
in its choice of domestic policies, s = θ and t = 0, and tailors its tariﬀ level to satisfy the
constraint. ¥
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